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"The Refurbishing": Reflections Upon Law
and Justice Among the Stages of Life
RICHARD 0. BROOKSt

"[T]hat there be a refurbishing of the ancient idea of life
stages."1
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court, in a recent opinion,
held that the execution of individuals under eighteen years
of age at the time of their capital crimes is prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 The Court found
juveniles lack maturity and responsibility, are vulnerable to
outside influences, and have less control over their

t Thanks to Elizabeth Holder, Kathy Leonard, Laura Gillen, and Judy Hilts for
typing drafts. These "reflections" are offered in two moods-the mood of lofty
Stoic and Epicurean acceptance of the inevitability of the stages of life, see
PIERRE HADOT, THE INNER CITADEL: THE MEDITATIONS OF MARCUS AURELIUS 59,

148 Michael Chase trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1998), and the mood of irritated
feelings of admittedly increasing slight discrimination, paternalism and
irrelevance, and guilt at securing the benefits of aging, all of which come with
my own aging and society's response to it. This work of reflection is, in part, a
pay back to Brandeis University and Robert Morris, who helped to support my
graduate studies with a grant pertaining to the law of aging many years ago
(despite the fact that at the time, I was uninterested, indeed repelled at the
prospect of aging and the study of it!). Additional thanks to Kaylea White, a
Vermont Law School student, who helped with some of the research.
1. DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY

37 (1987). A particularly apt quote along these lines is from Robert Garland's
study of the ancient Greek stages of life; the quote about his account of such
stages is, "[W]hat we have been examining is the artificial insertion of high
drama, with all its many exits and entrances, into the palpable obscure passage
of time." ROBERT GARLAND, THE GREEK WAY OF LIFE 290 (1990).

2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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surroundings. 3 The majority based
these conclusions upon
4
human development literature.
The Roper v. Simmons majority opinion and the dissent
raise several questions: is there a discernible "juvenile"
stage of life? If so, what are its boundaries? Is this stage of
life a social construct or does it have a biological basis?
What capacities or incapacities does each stage have? Do all
individuals fall within the stages of life? What is or should
be the ethical significance of a stage of life? What is or
should be the legal significance of such stages? As applied
to the juvenile stage, these issues were discussed in the
briefs, the oral argument, and the court opinions
themselves. 5 The designation of diminished responsibility
for juveniles is an example of our legal system's provision of
legal duties and immunities based upon stages of life. The
stages of foetal development, birth, infancy and childhood,
adolescence, marriage and family, old age and retirement,
as well as impending and actual death all receive special
treatment by the legislatures and the courts. 6 Some stages,
such as adolescence, marriage and family, and old age have

3. This succinct summary of the majority was offered by Sandra Day
O'Connor in her dissent. Id. at 598 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 569-70. Among other citations used by the court, see, for example,
Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective,
12 DEV. REV. 339 (1992). Justice Scalia's dissent took issue with the material
cited by the majority and its applicability in this case. See Roper, 543 U.S. at
617-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (opinions of Justices Kennedy, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Scalia); Brief for Petitioner, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03633), 2004 WL 903158; Brief for Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.
03-633), 2004 WL 1947812; Transcript of Oral Argument, Roper, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 2387647. Two specific briefs which contained
developmental studies were the Amicus Curiae Brief for the American
Psychological Association and the Missouri Psychological Association, and the
Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Medical Association, American
Psychiatric Association, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law, National Association of Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the
National Association of Social Workers, and National Mental Health
Association. See Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
1633549; Brief for the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549.
6. These stages and the laws pertaining to them will be described in more
detail below.
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entire legal regimes devoted to them; 7 other stages, for
example, non-family adulthood, are less explicitly
recognized by the law. Each stage is identified by the law
for one or another purpose, even if the stages are not seen
as part of an entire "arc of life." I seek to explore the legal
significance of these stages as part of an arc of life-an
entire lifespan. In the words of Daniel Callahan, there
needs to be "a refurbishing of the ancient idea of life
stages."
Two legal approaches may be discerned in seeking to
understand the stages of life. One legal approach-the
dominant one in our society-is a liberal egalitarian
approach, in which laws and legal decisions based upon
appeals to stages of life are viewed as unjustified
constraints upon the freedom to define ourselves and
pursue a range of actions at any age. Such freedoms
include, for example, older women who take advantage of
new technology to bear children at ages beyond the
"normal" child bearing years. Older men are countering
their declining sexual prowess with the help of Viagra and
other drugs.8 Older people can seek to rescue their sexual
and reproductive functions or return to school to complete
high school or college, but an adult cannot simply choose to
sit in elementary school in order to truly benefit from it the
second time around. Child marriages or basic social security
payments to young adults seem inappropriate; prohibiting
such early marriages or payments hardly seems to be an
illegal constraint upon one's freedom or equality. These
latter examples suggest the "intimation" of another legal
approach to the stages of life--one which recognizes the
"reality" of life stages and the need to design "life-stage"
appropriate laws.
It is this second alternative that I wish to explore in
this Essay. I wish to explore the legal relevance of an

7. By "legal regime," I mean a coupler of laws bearing upon or defined by a
given stage.
8. For a general view of the biology of men, see HARRY FISCH WITH STEPHEN
BRAUN, THE MALE BIOLOGICAL CLOCK: THE STARTLING NEWS ABOUT AGING,
SEXUALITY, AND FERTILITY IN MEN (2005).
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encumbered 9 self-one which is located within a certain life
stage. The question I seek to explore is: should the law
recognize our stages of life and if so, how? In posing this
question, some might ask: why should the law bother to
focus upon stages of life? 10 One answer simply is a
descriptive one-the law does attend to the stages of life.
Second, as the Roper opinion illustrates, the question arises
as to whether such legally recognized stages are soundly
based upon developmental studies which reveal a reality of
biological and social development.,
In this Essay, I briefly explore the notion of the arc of
life, of which the stages of life are a part. These stages of
life are often simply recognized as discrete stages of life
without being viewed as part of an entire life. My argument
in this initial section is that the stages of life must be
recognized as part of a unity of life rather than simply
handy categories for making some age-specific legal rules
and decisions. Fortunately, some Supreme Court decisions,
such as Roper, recognize how stages of life are part of a
larger life.
After rescuing the classic notion of "a whole life" as an
important consideration for the law, I turn to the
developmental and ethical literature which suggests the
proper basis for recognizing the content of these stages of
life. The developmental and ethical literature that argues
for a notion of stages of life may be both ancient and
modern. Therefore, a third task is to determine the
contributions which both ancient and modern ethical
treatments can make to an understanding of the stages of
life and their development. This literature reveals that the

9. The notion of an unencumbered and encumbered self has been advanced
most recently by MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
10. The personal answer to this question lies in my 70th birthday and the
dawning recognition that I am "an old man." I personally was never aware of
the stages of life until this period of my life, a period of inevitable retrospection.
11. I am painfully aware that a legal philosopher as great as Lon Fuller
takes issue with the notion that the law can pursue ideals rather than mandate
duties. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). There is,
however, a substantial body of jurisprudential opinions which disagree with
Fuller. See generally ARISTOTLE AND MODERN LAW (Richard 0. Brooks & James
Bernard Murphy eds., 2003).
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stages of life can be spontaneous expressions of nature, or
activities and norms articulated in custom rather than law.
In the fourth part of this Essay, I identify the functions
which law can play in regard to the stages of life. By
identifying such functions, I seek to justify why law, rather
than nature or custom, is required for the recognition of
stages of life in complex modern societies. In the final
section of the Essay, I seek to spell out the way in which the
law knits together the stages into our ethical and legal ideal
of the arc of life. Justice among the stages of life is an
important part of the social meaning of the arc of life. I
suggest that one role of law is the bestowal of justice among
the stages within an arc of life.
I. THE ARC OF LIFE AND ITS STAGES
The notion of stages of life rests upon the assumption
that each individual faces an entire life underlying and
framing the progression of stages. 12 Some ancient Greeks
believed that whether or not one achieves happiness
depends upon what happens during one's entire life. The
ancient Greek historian Herodotus tells the story of the
meeting between Solon and Croesus. 13 Croesus, at the
pinnacle of wealth and power, asked Solon if he, Croesus,
was a happy man. Solon demurred, saying he could not
answer until Croesus's life ended. 14 The notion of viewing

12. Although the notion of "an entire life" is one which emerges especially
strongly in ancient thought, see FRANCIS SPARSHOTT, TAKING LIFE SERIOUSLY: A
STUDY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 324-25 (1994), notions
of an entire life have been set forth by modern philosophers and others,
discussed below. There may be very different assumptions about the way in
which a path of life should be conceived, just as there are radically different
notions of the way history proceeds. In regard to the latter, see generally
CHARLES VAN DOREN, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1967). Thus, a life may be viewed
as an arrow of progress, a meaningless jumble, a series of disconnected
challenges and responses, an arc of growth and decline, a cycle-e.g., from dust
to dust-and perhaps many others. See RICHARD A. SETTERSTEN, JR., LIVES IN
TIME AND PLACE: THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISES OF DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 5-64
(1999).
13. HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES 13-16 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1998).
14. Id. at 15. Aristotle deliberates about this story and appears to conclude
that, except for many significant reversals of fortune, one might be happy if he
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happiness as a matter of a whole life cuts against the
pleasure-loving, "carpe diem" grain of many Americans.
And yet, despite our modern beliefs, it may indeed be a
whole life, and
the recognition of the importance of a whole
"arc of life,"'15 that makes the most sense when assessing
happiness.
If I take the long view of happiness as that which
characterizes a whole life, and I think 16 back upon my life
as an example, it appears to be roughly divided into a series
of rather traditional stages-birth and childhood, student
days, marriage and family, middle age, and now old age
with senescence in prospect. At the time I was in each
stage, I did not experience these stages as stages of life; in
retrospect these stages and my passage through them
seems obvious. 17 In this sense, acceptance of any theory of
stages of life may depend upon retrospection as these stages
wind down. Perhaps it is the jarring experience of entry
into the stage of old age which now stimulates my
remembrance of past stages.' 8 Perhaps the only other way
of taking the stages of life seriously is through literature.

or she engages in appropriate activities in accordance with a virtuous character
and necessary external goods at any time of life.
15. My figure of "arc of life" is chosen deliberately to acknowledge the
growth, peak, and decline of powers in many lives. Jung adopts the phrase
"curve of life." See infra note 161.
16. I am aware of the danger of relying upon the subjective experience of a
white aging male. Indeed, those legal theorists who appeal to subjectivity might
well reconsider when they witness such an appeal. For one of many subjective
approaches to the law, see ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 265,
290 (1993). Obviously, paths of life can be interrupted by accident and illness,
and be affected by gender and culture. Many people do not have the luxury of
ruminating about the stages of their lives. My appeals to stages of life will
account for individual and social differences and acknowledge the problems of
interrupting the progression of such stages.
17. The sense of stages of life, and their relationship to each other and to
law, depends both upon personal reminiscence and civic memory. This memory
will be discussed below.
18. The awareness of stages of life through memory raises profound
questions about the relations of memory and law; in this case, the memory is
not only my individual memory, but well may constitute a collective memory
built in collective consciousness, tradition, politics, and law. See, e.g., BRUCE
JAMES SMITH, POLITICS & REMEMBRANCE: REPUBLICAN THEMES IN MACHIAVELLI,
BURKE, AND TOCQUEVILLE (1985).
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Certainly the most famous literary treatment
Shakespeare's Seven Ages of Man in As You Like It. 19

625
is

All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players.
They have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages. At first the infant,
Mewling and puking in the nurse's arms.
Then, the whining school-boy with his satchel
And shining morning face, creeping like a snail
Unwillingly to school. And then the lover,
Sighing like furnace, with a woeful ballad
Made to his mistress' eyebrow. Then, a soldier
Full of strange oaths, and bearded like the pard,
Jealous in honour, sudden, and quick in quarrel,
Seeking the bubble reputation
Even in the cannon's mouth. And then, the justice,
In fair round belly, with good capon lined,
With eyes severe, and beard of formal cut,
Full of wise saws, and modern instances,
And so he plays his part. The sixth age shifts
Into the lean and slippered pantaloon,
With spectacles on nose, and pouch on side,
His youthful hose well saved, and world too wide
For his shrunk shank, and his big manly voice,
Turning again toward childish treble, pipes
And whistles in his sound. Last scene of all,
That ends this strange eventful history,
Is second childishness and mere oblivion,
20
Sans teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything.

19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7 reprinted in THE
ARDEN SHAKESPEARE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS ON THE SEVEN AGES OF MAN 5-6 (Jane

Armstrong ed., 2001). Armstrong has assembled a small book of quotes from
Shakespeare, which I shall draw upon. The number of stages, seven, will be
discussed below.
20. Id. at 5-6. The history provided here by Shakespeare's character in As
You Like It is in the context of demonstrating that the Duke shared his
unhappiness with others who experience unhappiness at all stages of life. In my
review of the literature of the stages of life, i.e., literature which explicitly
treats stages of life, the stages of youth, early adulthood, and old age are well
documented. On the other hand, adulthood and middle age are vast uncharted
seas. I must confess that in this inquiry, I am stimulated by a number of
elegant, recent books. See, e.g., TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE:

LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE (2002) (seeking to show how law allocates time in
society-work time, school time, community and family time). Rakoff explores
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As suggested above, the usual approach to the stages of
our life is through the liberal spectacles of "age
discrimination."' 2 1 Those concerned with age discrimination
begin with an underlying assumption that the stages of our
lives may, with some exceptions, be fungible units of time to
be treated equally. Equal treatment and freedom from
discrimination become the central moral and legal norm.
The burden is placed upon those who treat people of various
ages differently to justify that different treatment. That
justification is to be not in terms of age itself, but some
other justification, such as disability or lesser capacity. For
the legal disputes at the boundaries of time. He argues that there are collective
rules governing the time of our lives and that more such rules may be needed to
coordinate the times in our lives. The late Mortimer Adler, on the other hand,
sees time as allocated within our lives, and our ethical choices, in part, guide
that allocation. See MORTIMER ADLER, THE TIME OF OUR LIVES: THE ETHICS OF
COMMON SENSE (1970). While Rakoff sees time as allocated by law in society,
and Adler views time as being allocated within an individual's life, I view "the
time of our lives" as allocated by law as well. Whereas Rakoff sees law as
allocating time horizontally through society, I see law as allocating time
vertically over the course of our lives. And whereas Adler sees the allocation of
time within the static framework of an ethical life, I conclude that law helps to
create or ratify the pre-existing biological and social stages of our lives as well
as our ethical choices at different stages of life. Just as Rakoff finds that there
are disputes over the legal allocation of time in our society, and Adler shows
that there are ethical disputes about the allocation of the time of our lives, I
seek to show that there are legal disputes over the allocation of time at and
within the boundaries of the stages of our lives. These disputes, in part, may
assume that each stage of life has its own social meaning and excellence. David
Norton, as well as many others, has sought to define the excellences of these
stages of life by arguing that not only does a life have its penultimate stage of
excellence before old age, (yes, we do decline!) but each stage also has its
individual stage of unique achievement. DAVID NORTON, PERSONAL DESTINIES: A
PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM (1976).
21. The liberal approach seriously questions the notion of "stages of life."
See SANDRA FREDMAN & SARAH SPENCER, AGE AS AN EQUALITY ISSUE: LEGAL &
POLICY PERSPECTIVES (2003), for an excellent discussion of the liberal position.

The liberal approach to the legal dispute over stages of life has been
documented by Howard Eglit in his writings, including his voluminous three
volume treatise on age discrimination. HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION
(2d ed. 1994). This treatise reviews the myriad laws and cases which bear upon
the use and abuse of age determinations by the law. Eglit's focus is upon how
age determinations, especially discriminations of old age, may or may not
violate statutes and constitutional provisions designed to protect us against
inappropriate age discrimination. See generally EGLIT, supra. However, unlike
Eglit, I am interested in age determinations as markers of the stages of life, and
I seek to reflect upon the broader role of law in establishing these stages. Such
a topic is not a standard legal topic and hence my reflections extend over a
broad range of legal and non-legal subject matters.
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example, one issue which arises in tort law is whether
people of different ages have the capacity of committing
intentional or negligent torts. In several cases, courts have
found that children or the elderly may
lack the capacity to
22
commit intentional or negligent acts.
Such an "age blind" approach may seem especially
appropriate as applied to the elderly when the aged are now
living longer and maintaining their vigor. Such liberal
flexibility seems appropriate to other stages of life as well,
such as when middle aged people return to school or middle
aged women bear children. Such events suggest that stages
of life have no meaning in a modern world. The liberal
approach, which may ignore the stages of life but which
acknowledges differing capacities, is often extended to a
radical liberal approach in which even capacities are
ignored, and one is deemed free to determine (perhaps with
the help of technology) who one is.
Not only does freedom 23 offer a modern rationale for
ignoring the stages of life, but the ideal of equality may as
well. Whether equality is treating like persons alike (and
all ages are deemed alike), giving persons equal dignity
(and all ages deserve equal respect), or recognizing equal
needs (all ages have equal needs), the rationale is one of
beginning with each stage of life treated equally. 24 There is
something wrong with this liberal egalitarian approach to
the stages of our lives. Like the color blind ignorance of the
reality of the lives of other minorities, an age blind legal
approach seems to fail to "recognize" the young as young,
and the aged as aged. Such an approach seems at odds with
my own subjective experience of age and the subtle but very
real way in which I am treated increasingly as aged by my

22. For a review of the relationship of standards of negligence to children
and their development, see Lisa Perrochet & Ugo Colella, What a Difference a
Day Makes: Age Presumptions, Child Psychology, and the Standard of Care

Required of Children, 24 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1376-97 (1993).
23. As I shall set forth below, freedom may be a rationale both in the sense
of absence of societal or government constraints, and also realized through the
economic market. Thus, government should not constrain our freedom by
mandating stage of life requirements and/or the market should function to
define the stages of our lives.
24. For a more general discussion of equality in relation to the stages of life,
see Sandra Fredman, The Age of Equality, in AGE As AN EQuALITY ISSUE: LEGAL
AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 21, at 21.
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fellow workers, students, and citizens. (I am fully aware
that some of my fellow older citizens do not "feel" old, nor
believe that they are being treated as old. I believe they are
wrong; indeed, they are "in denial" about the realities of
aging.) Although I, unlike some modern legal scholars, do
not believe that subjective feelings should determine how
the law should be shaped or understood, 25 my subjective
feelings of aging at least raise questions for me and others
as to the validity of the legal views of those who deny their
reality of the stages of our lives. It will remain to provide
more objective arguments for recognizing the stages of life
in law.
Consistent with my classical Greek bias, 26 I begin my
analysis by looking at all of the stages of life. I compare the
approach taken by the classical Greeks 27 to that taken by
the liberal egalitarians and find the classical Greek
approach a preferable one, albeit one that requires
modification by the differences between classical Greek and
modern life. One of many important conclusions of the
classical Greeks is that law is intertwined with biology and
social life, as well as with the law of the political
community. Thus, for the Greeks, biology and social
customs are conditions to which law must adapt. As Greeks
pursued their goals in life, these goals reflect, and are
reflected by, recognized stages of life.
The experience of the ancient Greeks suggests a
different role for our modern law in dealing with the stages
of life rather than simply the liberal role of rectifying
discrimination. The law performs several distinct functions
with regards to the stages of life. It establishes, creates, or
ratifies the boundaries of the stages of life; it allocates
goods within these boundaries, and it helps give meaning to
the various stages (partly by defining the appropriate
nature of time suited to each stage). It also establishes
distinct legal regimes for selected stages of life, especially

25. For the subjective approach to the law, see generally DAVID GRANFIELD,
THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY (1988).

26. See ARISTOTLE AND MODERN LAW, supra note 11.
27. For an overview of the Greek view of the stages of life, see GARLAND,
supra note 1. It is important, however, to realize that different Greeks had
different views of the stages of life as evidenced in their philosophy and
literature. The issue of pluralism and life stages will be discussed below.
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youth and old age. It establishes links between and among
the stages of life. Finally, the law helps to define the justice
relevant to each stage and between the stages. Each of
these six legal functions finds expression in legislation and
court opinions. In short, there is a law governing, and
governed by, the stages of our lives.
But even if the law does, in -fact, mark the stages of our
lives, the question may be asked: should law have anything
to do with stages of life? Perhaps there should not be any
societal recognition of stages of life or, if there are to be
stages of life, they should be shaped by custom 28 or markets
alone, and not by the law.
Both conservative
market-oriented
and
liberal
egalitarian theorists may ask such questions. They may
suggest that by allocating boundaries, goods, and meanings
to the stages of life, law plays an inappropriate activist role.
That is, they may suggest that law should not play such a
role in creating or allocating goods and meaning to the
stages. This view is composed of both those who believe that
a more efficient way of handling age is by means of
individual choice in the marketplace, and those who believe
that norms of civil freedom and equality should protect that
choice. Such a view may depend upon some form of
utilitarianism according to which what is important is not
any stage of life, but rather, simply the realization of our
desires at any and every stage. These desires may be
facilitated by the absence of inegalitarian government
regulations as well as the provision of market supports.
Thus, for example, if technology provides a method by
which old women might have children, one might leave it to
market demand as to whether or not such children are
spawned. This view may appeal to one aspect of our selffulfillment, which includes29 the notion that we should be
able to achieve our desires.
28. Conservatives may take different views toward custom, seeing it as the
operation of consent over time (without the role of law) or as intermingled with
law. For a recent taxonomy of conservatism, see JOHN KEKES, A CASE FOR
CONSERVATISM (1998). Since custom does recognize stages of life, the latter
conservative may have little difficulty with stage of life laws.
29. The notion of self-fulfillment is set forth and analyzed by Alan Gewirth.
See ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT (1998). Gewirth argues that part of
fulfillment is the realization of our deepest desires. The criteria for "deepest"
desires come from developing a notion of our capacities. Thus fulfillment
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One answer to the liberal view of the law of the stages
of life is that the law does in fact define stages of life and
takes an especially activist role in regard to youth,
adolescence, and old age, creating a dense legal regime for
the young, the juvenile, and the elderly.30 Since social
practice and its laws recognize stages, perhaps the
existence of this practice is sufficient. Certainly it appeared
as if the Greeks believed that a descriptive account of the
biology and conventions of society was relevant to the
justification of the moral and legal norms they followed.
A deeper response to the liberal view is possible. This
response draws upon Michael Sandel's critique of the
liberal assumption of "the unencumbered self. ' 31 Sandel's
critique suggests that the liberal perspective ignores the
extent to which our identities are thickly constituted, that
is, "encumbered" by our connections to our community.
Extending this notion, I would argue that the self is not a
machine of timeless desires, but a character subjected to
the stages of life determined in part by nature and society,
in part by habit and choice, and recovered by remembrance,
reminiscence and commemoration. 32 The law does not
ultimately is a combination of achieving our deepest aspirations and realizing
our capacities. Thus, pursuing our desires, whether through the market or
elsewhere, is not enough. See generally id. Modern philosophers, either through
revamped theories of the virtues or by appeal to capabilities, have extended the
notion of capacities. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); THE QUALITY OF LIFE
(Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). For a sympathetic critique, see
DAVID A. CROCKER, Consumption, Well-Being, and Capability, in ETHICS OF
CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP 366-85

(David A. Crocker & Toby Linden eds., 1998). Human development literature
seeks to document the changing human capabilities at different stages of life.
See LAURA E. BERK, DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN (1998). The notion of
self-fulfillment may still have room for different views of the path of life as
described above. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
30. I am painfully aware that what is the case need not determine what
should be the case. Thus, the fact that stages of life are recognized in law need
not determine that they should be. However, the reality of that recognition
should invite us to explore the principles or "intimations" which may be tacitly
found within these laws. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE
OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) for an example of such an effort.
31. SANDEL, supra note 9, at 11; LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael Sandel
ed., 1984). A comparable term is "thick" self.
32. For a discussion of the "thick" self, made up in part from the kinds of
remembering, see EDWARD S. CASEY, REMEMBERING: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL
STUDY (2d ed. 2000).
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merely ratify stages of life, their boundaries, and their
social meaning as given, but does so, or at least should do
so, as a vehicle for the self-fulfillment of citizens. Law
promotes that self-fulfillment based, in part, upon our
changing capacities at different stages of our lives. Selffulfillment is the development of these capacities and the
accommodation of our lives as these capacities wax or wane.
The definition of the meaning of each stage of life, the goods
appropriate to it, and the justice it deserves, i.e., the
incremental specification of social responsibilities and
rights, are defined in terms of the changes in our selffulfillment based upon our changing capacities throughout
life. 33 As the law helps to define the boundaries and
meanings of the stages of life and the obligations to and
from children, adolescents, parents, and the elderly, the law
also helps to define these stages of life. 34 Thus, a portrait of
the legal treatment of the stages of life is only drawn after
tracing a series of specific decisions about the boundaries,
social meanings, and obligations or rights pertaining to
each stage of life. I shall sketch this portrait of the law of
the stages of life in this Essay.
Thus, I share the classical Greek belief that law does,
and indeed should, play an important role in the steps of our
self-development. This jurisprudence of self-development,
that is, the assumption that law can support or promote
self-development, is one which has been vigorously opposed
by a wide range of pragmatic, positivist, and liberal legal
philosophers. 35 In this modest Essay, I do not seek to refute

33. These changing capacities are partly descriptive, found both through
observation and reflection. However, there may be a pluralism of capacities,
especially from culture to culture, and there is the possibility of serious doubts
about one's capacities. These doubts may only be resolved through inquiry and
choice; action may be required to test whether such a capacity exists.
34. It is important to distinguish between obligations between generations,
the frequent subject of ethical and legal inquiry, and obligations between
persons at different stages of life. The former category focuses upon our
obligations to persons who may live beyond us; the respective stages of their
lives are less relevant. See JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS

(Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., 1992). The latter focuses on the
obligation of persons at one stage of life to others at different stages of life.
35. One of the most eloquent is Lon Fuller, who argues for a law pertaining
to duty, not to self-perfection ("a morality of aspiration"). See FULLER, supra
note 11, at 5; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (also rejecting a
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directly the assumptions of these philosophers, although I
hope my discussion of the law of the stages of life will begin
to offer a refutation of the impoverished view of law that
ignores its role in self-fulfillment.
II. THE SOURCES OF THE STAGES OF LIFE
"Youth like summer morn, age like winter weather;
36
Youth like summer brave, age like winter bare."
Shakespeare's accounts of the ages of our lives appear
closely related to the objective movements of nature. But, in
fact, a certain indefiniteness surrounds any effort to
recognize and define the stages of life, partly because the
sources of the stages are multiple and intermixed with 37one
another. The beginning source of the stages is biology. It
38
is this biology which underlies our human capacities.
However, the extent to which stages of life are based upon
biological considerations is much debated. In Roper, the
majority opinion and the amicus briefs of the American
Psychological Association and the American Medical
Association cited recent brain studies of juveniles
suggesting differences from adult brains. Others have
argued that the stage embracing the juvenile years is
merely a social construct. 39 They suggest that natural
capacities are developed and impeded by culture, custom,
choice, and markets, as well as the law itself. All of these
factors operate to promote or impede the development of
human capacities and their accompanying activities.
Aristotle recognized these sources in the formation and

jurisprudence of self-development). See his restatement in JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE
AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 18-24 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
36. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, PASSIONATE PILGRIM, reprinted in THE ARDEN
SHAKESPEARE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS ON THE SEVEN AGES OF MAN, supra note 19,
at 12.

37. It is perhaps no accident that the most recent book entitled Time of Our
Lives is Tom Kirkwood's book on the science of human aging. See TOM
KIRKWOOD, TIME OF OUR LIVES: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN AGING (1999).

38. Much of the human development literature focuses upon the biology and
psychology of the aging process through life. See KATHLEEN STASSEN BERGER,
THE DEVELOPING PERSON THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN (5th ed. 2001).
39. See Julia Fionda, Legal Concepts of Childhood: An Introduction, in
LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHILDHOOD

3 (Julia Fionda ed., 2001).
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operation of ethical life and political society. 40 He also
recognized that they were intertwined, each with the other,
so that social practices had dimensions of nature, custom,
choice, and law. 41 Since Aristotle, the history of thought has
provided an elaboration of the account of each of these
sources of life's stages, although, in recent times, the study
of the contribution of each of these sources is subdivided
into numerous disciplines. 42 Let me describe briefly the
biological, cultural, market, and legal sources of life's
stages.
43

A. Nature and the Stages of Life

There is a sense in which we regard all time as natural,
44
and our moving through time as a natural process.
40. Such a background exists in many of Aristotle's treatises, including De
Anima. For an updated discussion of Aristotle's psychology, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAU-M

& AMELIE

OKSENBERG RORTY,

ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S

DE ANIMA

(1999). My favorite effort to "translate" Aristotle into modern terms is Mortimer
Adler's early work What Man Has Made of Man. See MORTIMER J. ADLER, WHAT
MAN HAS MADE OF MAN: A STUDY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF PLATONISM AND

POSITIVISM IN PSYCHOLOGY (Longmans, Green & Co. 1937).
41. For a particularly careful account of the relationship of the dimensions
of political and economic life, see JAMES BERNARD MURPHY, THE MORAL
ECONOMY OF LABOR: ARISTOTELIAN THEMES IN ECONOMIC THEORY (1993).

42. See SETTERSTEN, supra note 12, at 193-234.

43. Below, I shall treat the stages of life like a ladder of life, with the
primary focus upon each rung of the ladder. But the stages of life are
cumulative within one life and part of one life. See id. at 139-91. This
cumulative effect takes place because of the human capacity to choose and act
in the present from the habit and character acquired in the past and confirmed
by present choices, and the capacity to imagine, wish, and plan, in regard to
future stages of life. In regard to the past, our characters reflect our past and
we are capable of remembrance, celebration, and regret regarding the past
stages of our lives. In regard to the future, our current activities reflect the
present directions of our lives into the future; we or our parents may
consciously undertake education in our youth with a view to middle aged work
responsibilities, or undertake savings and pension during middle age for future
old age. Or, for example, we may make wills while imagining our future stage of
death. For a discussion of the way in which our future death informs our
present life, see HERBERT FINGARETTE, DEATH: PHILOSOPHICAL SOUNDINGS
(1996). For the way law enables us to cope with our own death in the future, see
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
(1970). Below, I discuss death and dying as possible stages of life. In all of these
activities, we knit the stages of our lives (and death) together. Nevertheless, it
is useful to explore each stage on its own. To do so, however, we must first
disaggregate the intertwined sources of these stages.
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Certain stages of life---childhood, adolescence, child
bearing, and aging-are viewed as reflecting basic
biological processes. A myriad of works in human
development may be found that seek to define the
relationship of biology to the human stages of life. These
works regard nature as the bedrock of the stages of our
lives. To the extent that law attends to the stages of life,
such a biological basis for the stages
of life offers a kind of
45
objective "natural law" to guide us.
Although there are biological realities which shape
some of the stages of life, these realities cannot offer a
sufficient explanation of the nature and scope of these
stages for several reasons. First, the biological
understanding is incomplete; we do not have a complete
understanding of growth and/or decline that would yield a
firm and specific biological basis for understanding the
stages of life. Second, what knowledge we do have about the
biology of our lives does not appear to dictate, except within
44. I discuss briefly some of the different views of time in the Conclusion. It
is important, however, at this point to point out that although stages of life may
be compatible with all views of time, a time which is measured by natural
motions (whether of season, life cycles etc.) is perhaps the kind of time most
"suited" to the notion of stages of life. Stages of life may be viewed as analogous
to stages of history and hence the inquiry into the different kinds of possible
patterns of history may be particularly relevant; for example, do these stages
constitute no pattern, a pattern of regress, cycle, or progress? And if the stages
of life mark "progress" though life, what kind of progress? For a discussion and
categorization of the kinds of progress, see CHARLES VAN DOREN, THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 26-32 (1967).

45. The notion is that we should do "age-appropriate" things. For those who
see a sharp separation between a description of nature and our ethical lives,
such a "natural law" of the stages of our lives is unconvincing. Some from this
latter point of view suggest that we should fight our age, and obey Dylan
Thomas's injunction: "Do not go gentle into that good night." See Dylan Thomas,
Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, in THE POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 239
(Daniel Jones ed., New Directions Books 2003) (1971). Although Aquinas does
not base his natural law upon stages of human development, he does
specifically relate them to stages of biological development beginning with all
substances, then extending to all mammals, and finally finding a series of
general obligations in human social life. Much to the annoyance of modern
jurisprudential thought, these natural laws are formulated in very general
language. See THOMAS AQUINAS, Treatiseon Law, in THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 205-336 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Daniel J. Sullivan ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952) (focusing on
Part I of the Second Part, Questions 90-108, especially Question 94). For a
modern interpretation of Aquinas, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1980).
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broad ranges, any specific behavioral patterns to be
adopted. Third, as a consequence of this flexibility of
nature, the elements of culture, choice, and law can operate
upon biology to significantly shape the stages of life. The
various cultures, choices, and laws result in somewhat
different definitions of the stages. Most recently, culture
and choice may intervene, resulting in the manipulation of
biology, changing it in key ways. 46 The administration of
growth hormones, contraceptive pills, Viagra, and Botox
treatments all represent human interventions into the
biological stages of our lives. (Custom and markets may be
the sources of such interventions and one indirect way in
which the law may intervene into the stages of our lives is
to seek to regulate these customary interventions into
biology.) Finally, the deep desires we may have and hold
onto may not correspond with our biological capacities and
hence the fulfillment of those desires as
an object of ethical
47
life cannot be defined by biology alone.
B. Custom and Cultural Sources of the Stages of Our Lives
In Roper, both the oral argument and the opinion
discussed how different states and different nations treated
the capital punishment of juveniles. 48 Although there was
no explicit discussion of whether there were different
underlying customs as to how juveniles should be treated
and consequently different social perceptions about what it
meant to be "a juvenile," the Court's recognition of
differences seemed to suggest that the definition of a
"juvenile" was at least partly the product of different

46. Although modern manipulation is the most obvious effort to rearrange
biology, more ancient mechanisms, whether through magic or religious
practices, may have altered biology as well.
47. This, of course, is very controversial in light of the recent flood of
naturalistic ethics positions, some of which have emerged out of
environmentalism. Although it is neither possible nor desirable to canvass these
positions, one good example is PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986). These theories, however, must address the
question of Hume and Moore's "naturalist fallacy," i.e., deriving an "ought" from
the "is" of nature.
48. See generally supra note 5.
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customs. Aristotle and Aquinas 49 were acutely aware of the
role of custom and differences in custom in the definition of
the ways of our community. Comparative anthropology and
sociology are the modern sciences of the study of
comparative cultures. Famous anthropologists such as
Margaret Mead were particularly interested in the impact
of culture upon personality development, and Ruth
Benedict viewed
cultures themselves as having
"personalities. '' 50 Recent anthropology approaches unique
these
matters through the lens of multiculturalism and identity.
These interests reflect the recent rise of the ideal of
diversity as a social and political ideal. Legal theory
continues to struggle with articulating the appropriate role
of law with regard to culture and, consequently, one would
expect that this struggle would be reflected in any effort to
define law's role with regard to the cultural definition of the
stages of life. Given our modern knowledge of diverse
cultures, we may conclude that there are many ladders of
life within the multiple cultures of the world's societies.
The problems which lie in any cultural approach to the
topic of stages of life is that political, ethical, and legal life
may lay claim to universal obligations and rights applied to
social and cultural practices. Thus, the law, at least the
Western law, may prohibit the practice of the Suttee within
Indian communities in the United States. This practice
applies to the stage of widowhood in which the widow hurls
herself upon her dead husband's funeral pyre. It may be
suggested that to endorse such a stage of life violates
certain universal rights of equal freedom of the widow and
fails to recognize important duties to surviving children;
hence it may be deemed inconsistent with universal rights
of modern life, as well as being inconsistent in societies in
which widows may have economic independence. To be
sure, such cultural practices as the Suttee are changing in
India, due to the forces of modernization and the migration
of ideas, and these practices may be "mixed" with other,
incompatible practices, due to the admittedly imperfect
workings of modern "melting pots." The modern awareness

49. See DAVID VANDRUNEN, LAW & CUSTOM: THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS
AQUINAS AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON LAw (2003).
50. See, e.g., MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA (1928); RUTH
BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE (1934).
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of the variety of cultures has led to both the respect of
different cultures, but also to the recognition that such
cultures may be better or less fitted to more 51
universal
norms which meet the demands of modern society.
The issue of the relationship between universal
obligations growing out of the stages of life and the fact that
different cultures have different stages with different
obligations is well illustrated in the case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 52 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
voiding of a criminal conviction of Amish parents who
refused to send their children to school under
Pennsylvania's compulsory education law. The Court based
its ruling upon the constitutional freedom of exercise of
religion. 53 Many in the modern world would regard a
completed secondary education as a universal good to be
secured at a certain stage of life in the modern world. Yet
the Court permitted the parents to let their children leave
before completing this education, finding that to compel
them to complete such an education was not justified in
light of the kind of life they sought to live and the
vocational education they
would receive outside of school to
54
prepare for their lives.
This case not only illustrates the clash of two cultures
with somewhat different boundaries for the stages of life,
but also poses the question as to whether the culturally
defined stages of life match the realities of modern society,
and whether such stages meet the requirements of
universal rights and obligations. The Court rested its
decision on the conclusion that the Amish mode of
education would serve the young people in their Amish way
of life, and that a way of life may seek the freedom of
religious protection in a dominant society. 55 The dissent
raised the question as to whether such a judicially carved
exception to compulsory secondary education did not violate
the students' right to a secondary education needed in a
modern world. The majority avoided that issue and, in so

51. For an excellent overview of these issues, see NUSSBAUM, supra note 29.
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. See generally id.

54. See id. at 222.
55. See id. at 215.
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doing, avoided the question of whether there was indeed a
more universal "right to an education."
C. Individual Choice and Markets
The notion of a uniform set of stages of life appears to
contradict our notions of an individualized life with its own
stages, oft celebrated in biographies or memoirs. This sense
of our own and others' lives may find any scheme of stages
of life irrelevant to the developments in one's own life. In
any one life, there may be stages missing-no marriage, no
raising of children, or death at early age cutting off the
stage of old age. Alternatively, there may be repeated
stages-i.e., divorce, remarriage, and a new set of children.
The stages may not follow in lock step, e.g., a person may
remain always a child or be old before his time. And, the
stages of life, even if they exist for a person, may be defined
in an entirely different way.
In Roper, Justice Scalia argued that even if there is a
juvenile stage of life, there was no guarantee that the
accused individual in the case fit within that stage of life
and should be treated as a juvenile. 56 For Scalia, the
vagueness of the definitions of the juvenile stage and the
within
consequent question as to whether an individual fit
57
the stage argued against treating him as a juvenile.
These observations may lead one to conclude that the
"standard" stages of life are at most background features of
individual lives. The individual narratives of our lives have
a much more vivid meaning to us, whether these lives are
lives which follow standard stages or not. Stages of life
appear as merely the expressions of poetry or the product of
"scientific generalizations" of outside observers drawing up
averages of individually unique lives. The proposal to treat
generic stages of life as important may seem not only to
falsify our individual lives but also limit our sense of
freedom from any constraints mandated by the "normal"
stages we must traverse. Thus, we may respond like Ibsen's
Nora, 5s who rebels against her stage of marriage and

56. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-20 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. See generally HENRIK IBSEN, THE DOLL'S HOUSE (1909).
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motherhood. Hence, we may wish to fight against any
notion of stages of life, let alone a law based upon such
stages, with the spirit of the Spanish anarchist who said: "if
they give you ruled paper, write the other way."
Such a reaction may lead us to ask: to what extent do
we freely choose the stages of our lives and the content of
these lives? Different people choose to respond differently to
childhood
and
adolescence,
often
extending
or
foreshortening these periods. Creation of families and child
raising is increasingly the product of a choice enabled both
by new technology and new social institutions. How one
responds to old age appears to differ from person to person.
It is, perhaps, no accident that an existentialist, Simone de
Beauvoir, who places emphasis upon freedom of choice,
wrote a book about old age in which the role of choice of
activity within old age is emphasized. 59 Or that J.S. Mill,
with his emphasis upon freedom leading to individuality,
suggested protection of the freedom to engage in polygamy
as part of the definition of the life stage of marriage and
child raising. 60 For these authors, individual freedom
becomes the animating ideal in approaching the stages of
life, and the role of law becomes one of protecting that
freedom, in part through the protection of freedom of choice.
Such freedom is illustrated by those presently arguing for
same-sex marriages by appealing to the notion of the equal
freedom to select the gender of one's marriage partner, or
those who argue for the autonomy of assisted suicide-i.e.,
the right to set one's own boundaries to the stage of old age.
Although neither de Beauvoir nor Mill emphasized the
market place, part of the choice of the stages of our lives,
and the content of those lives may take place within the
economic realm through the market place. The market
place is very sensitive to the stage of life of its customers.
Television stations keep track of "the demographics." In
fact, stages of life may be partially created by the market.
Our purchase of insurance, retirement packages, and
housing may all be responses to a market that offers choices

59. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE COMING OF AGE (Patrick O'Brian trans.,

G.P. Putnam's Sons 1972).
60. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 154 (David Bromwich & George Kateb

eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
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of how we will define the stage of old age. 61 The law plays a
role here, enabling through contract and property law the
possibility of choosing through the market the stages of our
lives. If we find that objectionable, it may be that we object
to the "commodification" of the stages of our lives, feeling
that we should experience these stages in a manner
different from the purchase of a product or assessing it in
terms of costs and benefits. 62 One need not adopt a radical
liberal position in which stages of life are shaped only by
choice in order to recognize the truth that our choices, to
some extent, shape the stages of our lives.
D. The Law and Stages of our Lives
In addition to biology, culture, history, human
institutions, and choice, the law appears to play a major
role in the stages of our lives. The law sets age
requirements for many societal activities, including school
entry and exit, driving, drinking, military service,
marriage, and retirement. These legal age requirements
illustrate the law marking the stages of our lives. We must
be careful, however, in interpreting this law. There may be
no comprehensive legal view of the stages of our lives; these
laws may be merely pragmatic markers at various stages of
life, adopted in part out of custom, in part for various public
purposes. These legal markers may be unrelated to any
conscious public effort to define stages of our lives. Thus,
when the law sets ages for school entry or exit, marriage,
military service, driving, or retirement, these age markers
may be the product of pragmatic concerns as much as any
customary notion of the stages of life. The legal age of
school entry and exit, or retirement, may be dictated as
much or more by economic considerations as by any notion

61. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995). Posner sets forth the
extent to which the economics of behavior apply to different stages of life,
paying special attention to old age. Posner treats old age through the lens of
economic choices to be made in regard to (and in) this period of our lives.
62. This does not mean that Posner's economic discussion of old age is not
valuable. Quite the contrary; it is filled with insights, in part due to Posner's
own creativity.
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of what childhood or old age are.6 3 Thus, the appearance of
law establishing the stages of our lives may be simply the
product of our creative interpretation of the markers as
part of a larger life-cycle.
Perhaps here, the distinction which Robert Merton
64
makes between manifest and latent functions is useful.
The manifest function of the law is its explicit social
meaning, which may be simply a pragmatic purpose. For
example, the age of selective service may explicitly apply to
persons who are sufficiently strong and energetic to fulfill
certain functions of military service. The latent function
may be to establish a "legitimate time of life" for the
selection of a discrete population group who have completed
their primary and secondary education and have not yet
entered their employment careers. By selecting them as
eligible to be members of the armed services suited to
defend our nation, the state can establish a "natural" period
for recruiting its defenders without interrupting the
educational preparation of its citizens nor interfering with
the needs of the private market place. Moreover the state
can channel the energies of its young and potentially
dangerous 65 youth into the "constructive purposes" of the
military.
If the law does indeed contribute to the latent and
manifest functions of defining and shaping the stages of our
lives, it may do so in two ways. First, the law may depend
upon already defined stages of life-stages defined by
nature, custom and choice-in which the law seeks merely
to facilitate the operation of these forces in shaping the
period of our lives. Thus, as stated above, the law may
restrict the manipulation of nature to unduly expand the
otherwise customary
stages of life. The law may support
"preexisting" 66 cultural practices, and facilitate choices and
markets which define stages of life. Second, the law may

63. Thus, as discussed above in the Yoder case, the court viewed the age set
for school exit to be based upon the need to protect against child labor. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 226-29 (1972).
64. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 19-84 (1963).

65. By "dangerous" I refer both to socially dangerous (high crime rate), and
politically dangerous (possessing the potential for political revolt).
66. Since these practices might have historically been intermixed with the
law, it may be pushing things to say "preexisting."
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operate more directly upon the stages of life, seeking for
normative reasons to establish such stages in our political
society.
III. THE STAGES OF LIFE: CLASSICAL & MODERN VIEWS
"Toreverything there is a season .... ,,67
A. The ClassicalPerspective
In Roper v. Simmons, the majority argued that the
biological and psychological characteristics of juveniles
meant that they lack maturity and responsibility, are more
vulnerable to outside influences, and therefore have less
self-control. Thus, the majority was willing to draw
conclusions about the ethical character
of the juvenile that
68
differed in key ways from adults.
A general recognition of the stages of life as part of a
life-cycle does not indicate in any explicit way what the
ethical implications of these stages might be. The authors of
ancient Greece set forth the underlying ethical assumptions
of a law of such stages of life. Five assumptions governed
the Greeks: (1) lives unfold biologically and socially, and
that such an unfolding could be understood objectively; 69 (2)
this unfolding may be understood in terms of discrete
stages; (3) there are a series of goods of life and these are
realized in the unfolding of character; (4) these goods are
distributed by the political community to the various stages
of life; and (5) law plays a major role in the political
community's distribution of these goods.

67. Ecclesiastes 3:1.

68. Roper v. Simmons, 543 US. 551, 569-70 (2005).
69. This objectivity is yielded through disciplines, especially biology. See
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ARISTOTLE'S BIOLOGY (Allan Gotthelf & James G.
Lennox eds., 1987) (providing critical views of Aristotle's work in the field of
biology). The most relevant treatises are ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA (R. D. Hicks
trans., Adolf M. Hakkert 1965) (1907); ARISTOTLE, DE GENERATIONE ET
CORRUPTIONE (C.J.F. Williams trans., Clarendon Press 1982); ARISTOTLE,
HISTORY OF ANIMALS (D.M. Balme ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991);
ARISTOTLE, PARTS OF ANIMALS (A. L. Peck trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968).
See generally THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., Random
House 1941).
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Human biological and social development was assumed
in ancient Greece. That development might take place
through education complementing a biological unfolding of
human potential and enhanced by choices made, resulting
in the shaping of character. Development was perhaps best
described by the Greek concept of paideia,70 which assumed
progression toward an excellence of character as a
consequence of the stages which precede it.
The specific stages of human development were often
simply assumed. Thus, portraits of old age in Greek drama,
especially tragedy, were frequent. In his Ethics, Aristotle
characterized youth as not ready for moral lectures. In his
Politics, he carved out a realm of the household and family
life. He drew quick portraits of the stages of life in his
Rhetoric, finding audience sensitivity to different emotional
appeals of rhetoric depending upon the stages of life of the
audience. Thus, certain stages of life are indeed assumed in
the writings of the Greeks and Romans.
Not only did the Greeks believe in human development
to excellence, they also believed in goods of life-internal
goods including temperament and moral and intellectual
virtues, and external goods such as health, possessions, and
opportunities for leisure. 71 For Aristotle, these goods
facilitated the virtuous activities of humans. For
Nussbaum, these goods are capacities of humans, but at
least some of them are, or involve, external goods. In either
case, whether internal or external goods, for the Greeks,
such goods possess an objectivity and universality. Different
goods or amounts of goods would be relevant to different
stages of life; thus, the magnanimous adult should have
sufficient goods to share with others. The adult engaged in
the leisure of political or philosophic activity must have
sufficient goods to support such activity.

70. Paedeia is the shaping of the ancient Greek character, embodying the
notion of an ideal of excellence. See generally WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE
IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE (Gilbert Highet trans., Oxford 1945) (defining
paedeiaat length throughout).
71. A modern Greek scholar, Martha Nussbaum has listed these goods to
include life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought,
emotions, practical reason, affiliation, concern for other species, play, and
control over one's environment. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 29.
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The Greeks were comfortable with the notion that the
political community would provide opportunities for
receiving some of these goods through education and moral
practice, while other goods might be distributed by the
community or exchanged in the market. A just allocation of
goods would follow from the establishment of the goals of
the political regime; such goals would then guide the
distribution of those goods. 72 (This allocation was not
explicitly age related, but rather in accordance with need or
merit, or, in the case of exchange, in accordance with
supply).

72. An excellent modern discussion of distributive justice in largely
Aristotelian terms is WILLIAM A. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD
(1980). To my knowledge, there is no treatment of distributive justice
pertaining to stages of life; however, both need and merit, which may differ at
different stages of life, are treated as possible criteria for determining fair
distributions.
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The law had a role in the distribution of these goods
and their exchange. This law may also have been closely
identified with custom (at least at some stages of Greek
history), and, if so, it was designated as "nomos.' ' 73 The
close link between law and custom meant that the law was
reflective of the character of the law maker and the persons
to which the law applied. But the law also measured
distribution according to merit or need, corrective justice
according to the rectification of selfish deeds, and exchange
justice according to the market. 74 This means that any
effort to determine the stages of life and then distribute
goods appropriate to those stages would have to take place
by determining
what the need or merit was of each stage of
life. 75
B. Modern Modifications of Greek Wisdom
Modernity may be viewed as posing a fundamental
challenge to all of the classical assumptions. This challenge
has forced those of us who wish to "rescue" the classical
contributions (as an element of truth) to rethink each of the
classical premises. Despite that rethinking, I believe that
the notion of distribution of the goods of life in accordance
with the stages of our lives can be salvaged in some form.
But before undertaking such a salvage operation, I wish to
sketch the dominant modern position.

73. For a discussion of nomos, see NOMOS: ESSAYS IN ATHENIAN LAW,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY (Paul Cartledge et al. eds., 1990); MARTIN OSTWALD,
NoMoS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY (1969). A history of the

concept of nomos through Western civilization is set forth by DONALD R. KELLEY,
THE HUMAN MEASURE:

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION

(1990). The importance of nomos to the law of stages of life lies in the way in
which nomos unifies custom and law within one concept. This notion of nomos
seems to fit many of the laws dealing with the stages of life.
74. For a recent selection of articles that take an Aristotelian view of the
law, along with a detailed bibliography, see ARISTOTLE AND MODERN LAW, supra
note 11.

75. The concept of determining the need and merit of each stage of life is
found in Plato's Republic with education occupying childhood, military service
in early adulthood, philosophy in middle age, and political leadership in old age,
all designed to achieve justice both within man and the republic. See PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., W. W. Norton &
Co. 1985).
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The first classical assumption to be challenged by
modernism is the development assumption itself. This
challenge may take the form of a fundamental attack upon
the notion of "potentials" to be "realized," claiming that
such an assertion of human potential rests upon outdated
biological essentialism. The challenge may suggest that
there is no human nature (or no consensus upon what
human nature is), and hence, all decisions are made in
absolute freedom. At the other extreme from this position is
the adoption of a natural and psychological determinism
that does not make room for developmental change due to
choice over a life span. These proponents adopt the position
that an early determinism fixes character, foreclosing all
possibility of significant development through choice.
The second assumption to be challenged is the assertion
of stages of development. This challenge may seek to
demonstrate that development is continuous and that
stages are merely arbitrary categories for conveniently
grouping the continuity. Or, the challenge may seek to
attack the assumption of generic stages applicable to all
humans, maintaining instead that all stages are a matter of
individual biography rather than generic biological or social
development. Postmodern thought may challenge the
assumption of a unitary set of stages. A survey of modern
and ancient thought reveals a variety of conceptions of
stages-biological, religious, ethical, philosophical-all
differently formulated and suggesting a welter of pluralistic
conceptions of the stages of life. 76
A challenge to the third assumption may be the modern
argument that generic and universal goods do not exist.
Instead, the most we can say is that activities, states of
character, and objects are relative to the tastes or
preferences of individuals and groups and cannot be
necessarily categorized as suited to a certain stage of
human development.
Fourth, some modern philosophers have challenged the
assumption that the political community can or should act
as a distributor of goods. 77 This assumption, they suggest,
76. For one particularly good critical discussion of the stages of life, see
JOSEPH L. ESPOSITO, THE OBSOLETE SELF: PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF AGING

80-99 (1987).
77. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-232 (1974).
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depends upon the notion of a central "objective" distributor,
when, in fact, the distribution of goods in our society
reflects, and should reflect, dispersed agreements, customs,
and ways of life among its members. From this point of
view, what is important is that goods be distributed in
respect to the freedom of the individuals in society-a
freedom reflected either in agreements over the basic
democratic political institutions or in the market freedom of
contracting parties on a day-to-day basis.
As a consequence of this modern "liberal perspective,"
the important role of law is not to assign goods based upon
stages of life, but rather to enable citizens to freely choose
the activities, capacities, and objects they prefer at any and
every time in their lives. In some ways, such a modern view
is exhilarating. It appears to offer a marvelous sense of
freedom not only from heavy judgments about what is good
and bad, but also a freedom from a kind of time-a time
which, through its dictates, determines what goods we
should have and when. One finds this liberal perspective in
the views of old age as a golden period of new creativity.
A certain regime of law follows from this liberal
perspective. This liberal regime, to the extent that it focuses
upon age at all, does not focus upon it as a path of life
composed of stages. Rather, the liberal regime is composed
of laws adopted in accordance with the principles of welfare,
equality, and freedom. The primary concern of modern
welfare laws is to ensure the satisfaction of basic needs,
especially of the dependant young and the helpless old. The
primary concern of age-related modern regulation is to
ensure that age groups, especially the old, are not
discriminated against.
But such welfare and liberal concern does not reflect
any sense of the continuity and cumulativeness of growth
and decay of life processes, resulting in stages of these
processes. As stated above, the liberal law treats us as
"unencumbered selves" without biological maturation. Nor
does the law set forth a vision of the educational processes
which are part of, and which contribute to, the various
stages of life. By ignoring biology and the community, the
law can ignore the staged development of capacities over
time, instead seeking to freeze a momentary equality and
freedom.
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C. A Reconciliationof Classic and Modern
Not all modern thought has sloughed off the classic
view of the pathway of our lives. Two kinds of thinkers have
resisted such a radical liberalism. One group of thinkers
seeks to recreate classical ethical and political thought in
modern terms, reinterpreting thinkers such as Aristotle to
make him palatable in modern dress. Alan Gewirth and
David Norton exemplify this approach to classical ethics
and the stages of our lives, although the works of many
other theorists may be cited.78 For the most part, the work
of this group is one of philosophical reflection, not scientific
study. Nevertheless, it expresses the views of many people.
Most Americans believe in some form of an ethic of selfdevelopment. 79 Alan Gewirth, in his recent book, SelfFulfillment, seeks to justify this ethic and reformulate it to
answer the modern criticisms. 8 0 Gewirth distinguishes two
forms of self fulfillment: aspirationfulfillment and capacity
realization.8 ' In the former, we seek to realize our deepest
desires. In the latter, we seek to develop our capacities. In
aspiration fulfillment, in order to choose among or evaluate
which deep desires to follow, we must refer to our
capacities.8 2 (In this sense, human capacities give us the
criteria to evaluate our own and others' desires. These
capacities, however, are not defined by "essential" biological
characteristics). Applied to stages of life, our aspiration
fulfillment would require us to ask the question: what are
the deepest desires for the stages of our lives and what are
the deepest desires within those stages?
Unlike Aristotle, Gewirth's "capacities" are very
general. They include the capacity to follow rules that apply
impartially to ourselves and others, such as respecting
equal freedom and well-being ("universalist"); the capacity

78. Martha Nussbaum, especially in her more recent writings, has
emphasized the importance of linking freedom to her classically derived list of
goods.
79. For one effort to document this empirically, see CHARLES MORRIS, PATHS
OF LIFE: PREFACE TO A WORLD RELIGION (Harper & Bros. 1956) (1942); CHARLES
MORRIS, VARIETIES OF HUMAN VALUE (1956).

80. GEWIRTH, supra note 29, at 107-59.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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to pursue our own freedom and well-being ("personalist");
the capacity to realize ourselves in particular relationships
of
family,
friendship,
community,
and
politics
("particularism").
Gewirth spells out the complex
interactions
between the efforts to develop these
83
capacities.
What relevance do these modern philosophers have to
an understanding of the stages of life? At a universalist
level, our development through the stages of life may be
perceived as the stages of acquisition of a universalist
morality. Thus, Kohlberg's study of the stages of moral
reasoning may illustrate such an approach. 84 At the
personalist level, we may ask how stages of life contribute
to the development (or unraveling) of our intellectual,
emotional, aesthetic, and practical capabilities. Martha
Nussbaum describes such capacities in her work on human
development. 85 At the particularist level, we seek to
determine how our particular community defines and
promotes the specific relationships of our moral lives
throughout the stages of life. Gewirth argues that
ultimately, a particularist morality must be evaluated in
light of personal and universal moral standards.8 6 The
recent effort of the U.N. to develop a human development
index by which the human development promoted by
particular countries87is assessed exemplifies one approach to
such an evaluation.
A second group of thinkers seeks to extrapolate from
the modern works of Freud and others pertaining to the
stages of child development as well as the recent empirical
83. See id.
84. See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981). Kohlberg's work has been

subjected to criticism especially by feminists. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (2d ed.
1993). The application of stages of reasoning in moral development to legal
education is discussed in Paul T. Wangerin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative
Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1237
(1988).
85. NUSSBAUM, supra note 29, at 4-11.

86. GEWIRTH, supra note 29, at 107-59.
87. See, e.g., United Nations Development

Programme, Arab

Fund for

Economic & Social Development, Arab Human Development Report 2002:
Creating Opportunities for Future Generations.
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work of gerontology. By starting at both ends of the life
span, they seek to reassert the classical notion of the stages
of life and to recreate a modern interdisciplinary field of
human development with its sources in biology, psychology,
psychoanalysis and psychiatry, history, literature and the
social sciences. Since this work is dependent, at least in
part, upon ongoing empirical study, its conclusions are
more tentative. Erik Erikson's well-known work exemplifies
this approach, offering a particularly rich and stimulating
theory of the stages of the life span.88 The court in Roper v.
Simmons relied, in part, upon an appeal to Erickson's view
of the stages of life.89
Erickson, in the course of his writings over half a
century, developed an elaborate developmental theory. This
theory, based initially in the work of Freud and the postFreudian literature in ego development, begins its analysis
with psychosocial development in childhood, and gradually
expands to embrace the stages of life extending into old age.
Erickson viewed his account as a process of biological,
psychological and social/historical development which was
"epigenetic" in the sense that a ground floor plan of a
potential personality was increasingly articulated through
stages. These stages are unique in that each is a response
to an encounter of the previous stage-an encounter which
led to a crisis, a change of perspective and a radical
adjustment of personality. The crisis may be physiological,
psychological and environmental. These stages are
expressed as ways of behaving, subject to conscious
experience as well as unconscious inner states. Insofar as
the crises leading to each stage are not satisfactorily
resolved, compensatory mechanisms result at the next
stages of life.
Preceding these identified stages is the beginning of
life, either at conception, viability or birth. At the time of
conception, the law has identified relevant periods of the
life of the foetus based, in part, upon the biological
development of the foetus. The laws governing abortion,
infanticide, and tort liability take into account the stages of
foetal development. And hence, one might argue that
crucial stages of life are "legalized" before birth. The history
88. See, e.g., ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963).
89. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
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of the law pertaining to these early stages of life indicates
some of the difficulties in defining the stages and
determining appropriate responses to each stage.
After birth, based upon this theory of development,
Erikson projects eight stages of life: infancy, early
childhood, play age, school age, adolescence, young adult,
adulthood, and mature age. (Late in life, he and his wife
suggest two stages within the earlier "mature age" stage.) 90
Each stage, according to the Eriksons, has its unique
conflict: radius of significant relations, principles of social
order, psycho-social modalities, and psychosexual stages.
Erikson's theory has been immensely influential;
however, it has been preceded by, accompanied with, and
followed by a large variety of psychological, sociological and
philosophical theories which have offered different or
modified views of development and its stages. 91 One such
theory is David Norton's Personal Destinies, which was
written at the time of Erikson's first writings. 92 I have
chosen Norton's theory because it seeks to discuss many of
the philosophical questions raised by Erikson's theory and
in so doing, offers a link between the modern approaches of
thinkers like Erikson, and classical view set forth above.

90. For a summary statement by Erik Erikson and Joan Mowat, see ERIK H.
ERIKSON, THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED (W. W.

Norton & Co. 1997) (1982). The

number and nature of the stages have changed over the course of their work.
91. The works of Freud, Jung, Levinson, Valiant, Lidz, Neugarten, and
many others are relevant. For an excellent overview of the theories, see

generally

DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES

Austrian ed., 2002).
92. NORTON, supra note 20.

THROUGH THE LIFE

CYCLE

(Sonia G.
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Table 1. Erikson's Eight Stages
Psychosocial
Crisis

Radius of Significant Related Elements of
Relations
Social Order

Psychosocial
Modality

Psychosexual
Stages

I

Trust vs.
Mistrust

Maternal
Person

Cosmic Order

To Get
To Give in
Return

Oral-Respiratory
Sensory-Kinesthetic
(Incorporative
Modes)

II

Autonomy
vs.
Shame,
Doubt

Parental
Persons

"Law and
Order"

To hold (on)
To let (go)

Anal-Urethral
Muscular
(RetentiveEliminative)

III

Initiative vs.
Guilt

Basic Family

Ideal Prototypes

To make
(=going after)
To "make like"
(=playing)

Infantile-Genital,
Locomotor
(Intrusive, Inclusive)

IV

Industry vs.
Inferiority

"Neighborhood
,"
School

Technological
Elements

To make things
(=completing)
To make things
together

"Latency"

V

Identity and
Repudiation
vs.
Identity
Diffusion

Peer Groups
and
Outgroups;
Models of
Leadership

Ideological
Perspectives

To be oneself
(or not to be)
To share being
oneself

Puberty

VI

Intimacy and
Solidarity
vs.
Isolation

Partners in
Friendship
Sex,
Competition,
Cooperation

Patterns of
Cooperation and
Competition

To lose and find
oneself in
another

Genitality

VII

Generativity
vs.
Selfabsorption

Divided Labor
and
Shared
Household

Currents of
Education and
Tradition

To make be
To take care of

VIII

Integrity vs.
Despair

"Mankind"
"My Kind"

Wisdom

To be, through
having been
To face not
being

Source:

ERIK ERIKSON, THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED

Although Erikson's theory is tinged with ethical
implications, Erikson was primarily seeking to develop a
descriptive theory of human development. Yet for David
Norton, the theory of stages of life raises a series of
fundamental ethical questions. He believes these questions
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can usefully be explored within the context of the classical
theory of ethical self actualization in which the good life is
realized in deliberately chosen actions which are the
product of a gradually developed ethical personality. Such a
view, however, raises many questions including: if
development takes place in stages which are significantly
different from each other, how is the good determined in
each stage? Are the early stages of life simply rationales for
some final terminal point in our lives? Or can the good life
be achieved in terms of each stage? What yields the
continuity of each individual's personality and character if
it is fragmented into different stages? What determines the
nature of each stage of life? How do changes take place
between
each
stage? Are
the
stages
universal
characteristics, culturally determined or individually
conditioned? What is the relationship between bodily
changes, personality changes, and societal conditioning?
Identifying and answering these questions is important
because only their resolution will yield an appropriate basis
for any law based upon stages of life.
Norton answers these questions by appealing to the
self-actualizing ethical theory of the Greeks, which he
argues is not an ancient relic, but has been reinstated by
British idealists such as Green and Bosanquet in the early
1900s, and the existential philosophers such as Sartre in
the mid-twentieth century. 93 Norton advances an ethical
individualism in which the individual and her ethical
development are a fundamental reality. This reality of the
individual, however, can share in conceptions of a more
general humanity and can reflect more specific community
influences. The individual's development takes place in
accordance
with
a
continuity
of
stages,
each
incommensurable in meaning with one another. These
stages include childhood, adolescence, adulthood and old
age. Each stage has its own principles which give meaning
to the interests, habits, choices, and activities of that stage.
The meaning of childhood is dependency; adolescence is the
discovery of autonomy and the confrontation of choice,
adulthood is the recognition of the need to achieve within
the limitations of life, and old age is the recognition of the

93. Norton wrote before the recent renaissance of Greek ethical thought and
the works of Bernard Williams and Alasdaire McIntyre.
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absence of a future and the importance of the past. Within
each stage a certain excellence can be achieved in
accordance with the principles of that stage, 94 but the
fundamental satisfactions lie in the moment to moment
realization of this excellence within every stage. According
to Norton, the quality of one's life in the stage of maturity
and after lies in the developed consciousness of one's unique
destiny. Self-knowledge of that destiny leads to intimate
knowledge of others, as well as friendship and love based
upon a concern for the self-fulfillment of others. A
conception of justice and democracy (which Norton sets
forth in a later book 95) is based upon the community's need
to foster appropriate development of an individual selfactualization at each stage. Thus, Norton offers an
attractive blend of classical self-actualization theories
joined with a modern adoption of a theory of stages of
development of the individual.
The conclusion I reach in reviewing these two views of
the stages of our lives and the efforts to reconcile them is
not that the views identified and their modern
reconciliation offer knockdown convincing arguments for
the legal recognition of stages of life, but rather that they
offer tantalizing hypotheses which appear to emerge out of
the experience of life's stages while leaving empirical as
well as philosophical questions. These ethicists and
psychologists offer at least the background support for
belief in the stages of life with each stage having its own
meaning. This conclusion makes it necessary to think more
deeply about the way in which law allocates or should
allocate the goods of our lives into the stages of our lives. 96

94. For strong disagreement with this view as it pertains to old age, see
JEAN AMERY, ON AGING: REVOLT AND RESIGNATION (John D. Barlow trans., Ind.

Univ. Press 1994) (1968). Amery states a contrary position arguing that aging
marks the limits of self realization accompanied by the sense of time running
down and out. See generally id.
95. DAVID L. NORTON, DEMOCRACY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1991).

96. It is my contention that the law can best make use of the contributions
of psychoanalytic theory and the social sciences of development theory
indirectly though explicitly or implicitly adopting the ethical insights which
emerge from these theories. For a comprehensive overview of social science
theories, see SETTERSTEN, supra note 12. The work also offers an excellent
bibliography. Id. at 257-96.
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IV. LAW AND THE STAGES OF LIFE

"Now the law.., can be... framed to operate with
regard to any or all of the four facets of time .... [It
allocates] time to rest .... establishes a weekly rhythm of
rest.... coordinates, indeed synchronizes, the time off ....
and creates a texture of time that incorporates a symbolic
statement ....-9
Not only can law allocate the societal facets of time
within our lives, but it can also operate to structure the
phases of our lives. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court not only
recognized the juvenile stage of life and accorded it an
ethical significance, but also drew legal implications from
that recognition. Specifically, the Roper court concluded
that juvenile immaturity argued for mitigating the
retributive punishment of the youth and emphasizing the
possibility for future reform of the offender under the
criminal laws. 98 The role of law, however, is complex in its
definition of the stages of our lives.
A. The Legal Recognition of Stages of Life
The law marks the stages of our lives. Law establishes
all stages including the stage of foetus in vitro. 99 Common
law, statutes and the Constitution all recognize the
importance of one or another age for determining the legal
rights and duties of a person. For example, in the past
thirty years, the Supreme Court has articulated the foetal
stage. The resulting steps mark not only the development of
the foetus itself, but the respective obligations of others to
the foetus. 100 Courts have recognized birth as the beginning
of the autonomy of the infant and legislatures have
97. TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF
LIFE 8-9 (2002). Rakoff seeks to show how law allocates time in society. My
argument is an extension of Rakoffs, as I seek to explore how law alleviates
goods in their stages of time in an individual's life.
98. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).

99. The developmental map has altered over time as modern technology
appears to make viability of the foetus possible at an earlier stage. For a first
person account of foetal and early infancy, see LAURENCE STERNE, THE LIFE AND
OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY, GENTLEMAN (Ian Campbell Ross ed., Clarendon
Press, Oxford 1983).
100. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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determined the day of birth to be legally significant. The
beginning of childhood is marked by federal and state
education
laws
which
determine
eligibility
and
requirements for day care and education. Adolescence is
recognized in laws governing the trial, treatment and
rehabilitation of juveniles. The beginning of adulthood may
be measured by laws pertaining to the drinking of alcoholic
beverages, the eligibility for military service, and for voting
in state and federal elections. Minimum ages may be fixed
for marriage and the raising of children. Developmental
stages of parents are at least taken into consideration when
determinations are made regarding the termination of
parental rights. 1 1 Developmental considerations may enter
into consideration when courts determine custody, whether
under the best interests of the child standard, or other
standards. 102 The determination of dates for retirement
from public service, for eligibility for social security, and the
protection of people over a certain age from discrimination
all tacitly or explicitly recognize the onset of old age.
Similar stages are legally relevant to the making of
decisions at the time of death, including, but not limited to,
determination of competency and the stage of "terminality"
in the making of end of life decisions. 103 Let me give
examples of stage related issues in common law, statutory
and constitutional law. In common law tort situations, the
issue arises as to whether the child involved in either a case
of negligence or intentional tort is of the requisite age to be
"negligent" or capable of forming the requisite intent. For
example, in Ruiz v. Faulkner, an eight year old boy darted
onto a street to recover a ball and was hit by the defendant.
The court permitted the trier of fact to decide whether an
eight year old boy can be capable of contributory negligence,
based upon his age, intelligence, knowledge and

101. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of S.C., 587 A.2d 1299 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div 1991).
102. See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Legal Standards, Expertise,
and Experts in the Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 843 (2000).
103. For a particularly thoughtful discussion, see RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT
FREEDOM (1993).

ABOUT ABORTION,
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experience. 104 Similar issues about the capacities of persons
at different ages arise in criminal and contract law as well.
In statutory criminal law, the issue arises as to whether
juveniles should be treated differently from adults. Juvenile
and family courts have assumed jurisdiction over juveniles
to administer a set of rehabilitative remedies different than
those applied to adult offenders. A frequent legal issue
which has arisen is when it is appropriate to try a juvenile
as an adult offender. Legal scholars have studied the
implications of development theory to such issues of
juvenile justice. 105 The recent Supreme Court opinion in
Roper v. Simmons illustrates this issue.
Another statutory requirement of a life stage is the
stage of marriage and the family. This stage is governed by
laws which regulate premarriage procedures, the marriage,
spousal relations in the marriage, parental rights and
6
duties, and termination of the marriage. 0
In constitutional law, another stage of life may be
involved in the issue of mandatory retirement. In the
Vermont case of Aronstam v. Cashman, the Vermont
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionally mandated
retirement of judges at age seventy against the challenge
that such mandated retirement violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The court found such a provision to be
justified by the likely prospect that some judges would not
be qualified to remain on the bench after seventy, and
mandatory retirement was a method of preventing such an
occurrence. 107
The stages of life discussed above do not mention death.
Death may be perceived as either the arbitrary end of the
stages of life, or the natural end of those stages of life-an
end which informs the previous stages, and, in fact, a stage
104. Ruiz v. Faulkner, 470 P.2d 500, 500-03 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). For a
recent discussion of this stage of life, see FIONDA, supra note 39.
105. See MARGARET ROSENHEIM ET AL., A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

(2002) (in which these developments are laid out). For a particularly relevant
essay, see Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, 29 HOFSTRA
U. L. REV. 541 (2000).

106. For an overview, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAw & FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE (1989).
107. Aronstam v. Cashman, 325 A.2d 361 (Vt. 1974).
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of life itself, i.e., dying. Although many moderns regard
death as an unwelcome intrusion into the life processes, the
ancients and at least some moderns viewed death (at least
death in old age) as a natural process. Some, such as Leon
Kass, have argued that such natural processes should be
respected and not interfered with by needless efforts to
prolong life.108 Others, such as Ronald Dworkin, have
suggested that the end of life and the way in which one dies
allows expression of one's character. 0 9 Leonid Andreyev
has written a marvelous story, The Seven Who Were
Hanged, which profiles the different ways in which seven
convicted persons express their character as they meet their
death. 110 Thus, when death is seen as part of the living
process, it may be seen as expressive of the person's
character and personality, an essential part of the self or
others' narrative of one's life. Moreover, the stage of dying
itself has been neatly dissected into stages by the law.
Just as the laws touch upon and explicitly identify one
or another stage of life as relevant to the substance of the
law, legal scholarship does as well. Thus, books and articles
deal with such subjects as the law related to abortion and
foetal rights, infant mortality and infant and maternal care,
children's rights and child abuse, juvenile justice,
pregnancy and abortion in adolescence and the meaning of
marriage. There appears to be little work dealing with the
legal problems of the stage of middle age. Finally, there is
emerging an entire field of elder law embracing but not
limited to social security law and laws dealing with age
discrimination.
Despite the fact that laws and legal scholarship touch
upon the stages of, there is no general legal perception of
the stage in question as being part of a continuous series of
stages of life bound together in a whole life or life cycle.
Thus, each stage has its own principles and meanings, yet
each stage is not treated an arc of life. With some
exceptions, the law views the stages of life as simply
creating unique problems for a law to resolve. In short, the
108. LEON R. KAss, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN
AFFAIRS 299-318 (1985).
109. DWORKIN, supra note 103.
110. LEONID ANDREYEV, THE SEVEN WHO WERE HANGED (Herman

trans., 1st World Library 2004) (1908).
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classical vision of stages of a path or cycle of life (even if
described by modern developmental psychology and
perennially described by biographies) does not appear to
explicitly animate modern American law.
Yet, I suggest that if one looks at all of the ways which
the law deals with these stages of life, a plausible argument
can be made that modern law, perhaps unknowingly, has
expressed or created the semblance of a disconnected law of
life stages. Just as awareness of such a coherent set of
stages of life may only be initially available to an individual
who has traversed these stages and, through reflective
memory, recovers the stages and the laws pertaining to
them, society may have to engage in some forms of political
recollection. But even if such a self-serving interpretation is
rejected and the sum of the stages found in law is nothing
more than a serial display of each of the parts,
nevertheless, it is useful to regard these laws in a
somewhat classical fashion in order to construct the vision
of a progressive series of stages of life, each with its own
unique moral meaning.
B. The Specific Functions of Law in the Stages of Life
"[T]o state the function of [a law] is to refer it to the
attainment of valuable goals ...
A more pragmatic view of law's functions in relation to
the stages of life might bring the subject down to earth. 112
The law performs six related major functions:
(1)
The establishment of the boundaries of the
stages and the facilitation of transition from one
stage to another so that there may be...
(2)
The allocation of goods to the various stages,
including the establishment of autonomies and
rights in accordance with...
(3)
The articulation of the meaning of each stage of
life, which provides criteria which guide...

111.

JEROME HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 107 (1963).

112. Unfortunately, "bringing something down to earth" in legal discussion
suggests ignoring the ethical and normative political dimensions of the subject.
I do not propose to do that.
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(4)

The formation of a legal regime for each stage of
life requiring...
(5)
The establishment of linkages between and
among the stages of life...
(6)
With the articulation of a notion of justice
among and between the stages of life.
Each of these functions are expressed or implied in the
law; taken together, they may be properly labeled: "The law
of the stages of life." In this section, I shall discuss the first
three functions of the law. In the next section, I shall set
forth the notion of a legal regime of a stage of life and
discuss how it establishes a regime of law applicable to the
stage of old age. Then, I shall turn to the consideration of
how the law establishes links among the stages of life. In
the final section I shall discuss the difficult question of the
justice of the law of the stages of life.
1. Setting the Legal Boundaries of Stages and
Transition Between Stages. In the Roper v. Simmons oral
argument, the court debated over the proper boundary of
the juvenile stage. Scalia argued that states chose different
ages for different capacities; hence, there was no fixed
boundary for the juvenile stage. Other members of the court
seemed clearly less concerned about the fuzzy boundary of
the juvenile stage.
The legal recordation of key dates marks the
boundaries of the stages of our lives. Legal dates are
established applicable to conception and viability, birth,
entry into school, exit from school, eligibility for work,
operating motor vehicles, drinking alcoholic beverages,
voting, contracting, entering into the armed forces,
marriage, retirement, eligibility for social security, and
death. Whether reflecting societal custom or serving a
variety of pragmatic purposes, these dates may also become
important symbolic markers in our biographies.11 3

113. The symbolic functions of the laws are often ignored. Perhaps the best
known discussion in law was THURMAN ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
(1935). A more sensitive inquiry may be found in MURRAY EDELMAN, THE
SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1985). Legal scholarship which explores the role of
symbols in the law include such articles as Eric Posner, Symbols, Signals, and
Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998). An earlier
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Although these recordation laws mark the boundaries
of the stages of our lives, they do not do so with any
precision. Drinking, driving, voting, and armed service
eligibility dates may not coincide; hence the boundary of
entry into early adulthood may be a fuzzy boundary,
resulting in societal debates about the proper age for these
activities permitted or prohibited in relation to the
boundaries. These boundaries may be fuzzy for several
reasons. First, there may be societal disagreement about
the stages of mental and physical development necessary to
enter these stages. When is a person ready to drive, vote,
fight, and drink? It may be that as one turns to specific
activities, such as driving or voting, the dates for readiness
may differ. This difference may depend as much upon
educational and cultural as biological forces, but may also
depend upon individual differences; consequently any
uniform boundary may seem arbitrary. The differences in
dates may reflect history; at one period of our history, it
may have made sense that drinking or marriage ages would
be different than now. Also, the different cultures of our
nation-south and north, rural and urban-may have
customs which suggest different times for such stages as
marriage and child raising.
Recordation laws may serve to be written reminders,
but they serve other functions as well, including those of
reminiscing and commemorating. Reminiscing may involve
wistful story-telling of the past which we often share with
others. In commemorating, we engage in an intensified
eulogistic remembrance, often with rituals of solemnization
and celebration. The days chosen may mark anniversaries
of key beginnings or completions of stages of our lives, such
as first communions, bar and bat mitzvahs, graduations,
wedding anniversaries, and retirement ceremonies. Such
days may anchor both our characters and our societies,
providing markers for14 the narrative of our lives and our
communities' history.1
Closely related to these laws may be laws pertaining to
transition between stages of life. These transitions may be
religiously oriented culture recognized the symbolic importance of dates, such
as saints' days, and our society still marks key celebration dates.
114. For an evocative account of the roles of remembering, see CASEY, supra
note 32.
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changes pertaining to the stages of life. Such "passages of
life" have occupied the attention of psychologists,
115
anthropologists, religious thinkers and popular writers.
They seek to identify and describe the movements from one
stage to another, and help the person to make the
transition successfully. Thus, such transitions may be part
of individual choices, cultures, and markets.
Laws, such as those enabling learning permits for
driving prior to full fledged driving permits, illustrate such
transition laws. At one time, there were literacy laws for
voting eligibility which introduced the notion of being
educated prior to making the transition to citizenship.
Some have suggested an education period prior to and in
preparation for entering marriage. A proposal for legally
required retirement counseling offers another example.
Actual and proposed laws of this sort suggest the need for
legally supported societal preparation of the person as he
moves towards a new stage of life.
Such legal requirements for establishing the boundaries
of stages of life and mandating preparations for transition
constrain the freedom of those seeking to enter the next
stage of their lives based upon their own choice and their
own level of preparation. One set of legal controversies
illustrate the battle between a legally required date for a
stage of life and the claimed freedom of the individual and
the specific group to which he belongs. There are a myriad
of cases illustrating such a controversy.
Take, for example, the case of Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia.1'6 A policeman was involuntarily
retired from the police force. A Massachusetts law
mandated such a retirement. Although the policeman was

115. The psychological transitions are well documented in the psychological
literature dealing with stages of life, including the works of Freud, Jung,
Levinson, and Erikson. Anthropologists study such transitions in their study of
rites of passage, which recognize that such transitions involve changed
relationships in society. See generally MIRCEA ELIADE, RITES AND SYMBOLS OF
INITIATION: THE MYSTERIES OF BIRTH AND REBIRTH (Willard R. Trask trans.,
Harper & Row 1975) (1958). The analogous notion of religious transition is set
forth in, for example, a study of the sacraments. See, e.g., BERT GHEZZI, SACRED
PASSAGES (2003). Well known popular writers include WILLIAM BRIDGES,
TRANSITIONS: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE'S CHANGES (1980)
PASSAGES: PREDICTABLE CRISES OF ADULT LIFE (1976).

116. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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in good health, the law was based upon a recognition of the
general decline of physical health in late middle age and the
need for vigorous good health in the duties of the police. The
court found that age grouping was not a "suspect class" and
that the regulation in question met the requirement of
rationality.
The age distinction in Murgia does not correspond with
our customary notion of old age. In fact, various laws set a
range of age boundaries of old age beginning at fifty and
extending to seventy. Although the boundaries are flexible,
the message is not. The notion is that by age fifty or later,
society must begin to attend to basic biological decay. And
the individual is "invited" to define himself in light of this
new condition of life. To be sure, the boundary is not
defined as a stage of life. Instead, it is merely a marker of a
biological process of decay-a decay which may interfere
with some social functioning, i.e., policing, judging, etc.
Rather than explicitly define a stage of life, the law
identifies age as a stage of presumptive disability.
This approach is not uncommon. In one negligence case,
the court found the elderly plaintiff who tripped on a
sidewalk not to be eligible for a specifically lowered
standard in terms of age for purposes of assessing
contributory negligence. 117 The court adopted a disability
standard and found no evidence of disability. Thus, the
notion of "age" disappeared behind the label of "disability."
The explicit legal treatment of age is obliterated. 118 The
lesson appears to be that if you are old and in good shape,
the law can see you as "not disabled" with age being
irrelevant. Aside from this interesting result, the focus
upon boundaries may deliver two messages, namely, that if
you are a certain age, the law may assume you are disabled
by statute, but may inquire whether you are on a case-bycase basis in common law. A "stage of life" may be tacitly
identified, but disability becomes its principal marker!

117. LaCava v. City of New Orleans, 159 So.2d 362 (1964).
118. For a case rejecting the notion that old age standing alone should be
taken into account, see O'Connor & Raque Co. v. Bill, 474 S.W.2d 344 (Ky.
1971). For a discussion urging a relaxed standard, see Charles V. Barrett, III,
Negligence and the Elderly: A Proposal for a Relaxed Standard of Care, 17
MARSHALL L. REV. 873 (1984).
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The approach to the legal establishment of age
boundaries might be one in which a society grants the
freedom to the individual to the maximum extent possible
to define his or her own stage of life. Suppose, for example,
that a child wishes to enter the army or marry, a middle
aged man wishes to go to grammar school, or an old man or
woman wishes to marry and have children. We might
believe that such choices are imprudent, but, along with
John Stuart Mill, we may decide that if these choices don't
result in specific harm to us or others, they should be
permitted. From this point of view, the only markers of
stages of life there should be would be those which serve to
prevent harm to society. Any or all of the above might be
prevented, not on the basis of the appeal to stages of life,
but rather on appeal to the possible harms to society
resulting from such transgressions. Thus, a young child
entering the army or an adolescent entering marriage
might be a lousy soldier or parent respectively. A middle
aged man might learn differently from children in grammar
school and be disruptive in a class of grammar school
children. The prospect of old people who are permitted to
have young children with new young spouses raises the
eventuality of their offspring being orphaned. Like the
Massachusetts statute in Murgia, these judgments of harm
may be based upon assumption of development stages
themselves and their relationship to various social harms.
While the liberal approach simply identifies age related
probabilities of harm, the classical view is more willing to
posit stages of life directly. The liberal would argue that it
is preferable to begin with the notion of the individual
freedom to resist or ignore age categories and to permit the
individual to choose to define one's own narrative of life,
placing the burden upon the state to prove that certain
activities at a certain stage of life are harmful. The
classicist might respond that there is a certain comfort for
the individual to reflect upon his participation in natural
processes of growth and decline, that there may be other
advantages to the social support of the recognition of stages
of life, and that boundaries should be set for these reasons.
2. Legal Allocation of Goods of Life to the Stages.
Goods are activities in accordance with capacitiescapacities to engage in friendship, plan one's life, enjoy
beauty, play, contemplate, and so forth. Such a formulation
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of the goods of life makes it evident that in our society,
there must be opportunities to develop and exercise a
variety of capacities. Nature, choice, societal relationships
(such as family and markets), and the political community
may all be sources of these opportunities. Only some of
these resources can be distributed by the political
community. Some kinds of income, services (e.g., remedial
health services), and basic necessities such as food, shelter,
and clothing may be distributed by the political community
either indirectly or directly. Direct distribution is best
illustrated through such legal activities as the distribution
of welfare benefits or remedial health services. Indirect
distribution takes place when law helps to shape or
reinforce families or markets. Most kinds of distributions
are focused upon one or another stage of life. Goods, such as
education (at least certain kinds of education), may be
uniquely suited to certain stages of life and, when allocated,
will be colored by those stages. 119
There are goods which may not be readily distributed
among the stages of life, since such a recognition reveals a
limitation upon viewing government as simply a paymaster
who doles out fungible commodities to the young, middle
aged and old. These goods may not be divisible, and hence,
not allocable among age groups. Such goods include the
condition of our larger environment. These goods may be
commonly available because they are part of organized
systems, such as ecosystems which are not readily
disassembled. Common access to such shared goods may
operate to join people of different stages of life together.
Certain goods, such as friendship, may be divisible but not
readily controllable by the public. All goods, even money,
usually have to be used by the recipient to be good; certain
goods, such as health, are partly the consequence of the
character, habit, and choices of the individual, and hence
are not readily achieved simply through the act of
distribution. Certain goods, like education, may be
cumulative in the sense that when received, they may
depend upon prior distributions and generate further goods
on their own. And finally, certain goods may not be

119. One may argue that goods themselves are not fungible but are only
good relative to a stage of life.
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objectively scarce, but may be easily accessible to all if so
desired.120
These limits upon the distribution of goods create a
significant limit upon the notion of distributive justice in
which various goods are distributed according to some
criterion. Nevertheless, there are divisible and fungible
scarce goods which not only include wealth, but also,
perhaps more importantly, access to education, health
services, and a variety of other societal goods. Therefore, it
is useful to think about how these goods might be properly
distributed among the stages of our lives. 121 The classical
philosophers, especially Aristotle, as well as some modern
philosophers, recognize that the distribution of goods by the
political community may reflect certain distributive criteria
depending upon the nature of the political community.
Need, freedom, merit or wealth may be the distributive
criteria for democracies, aristocracies, and oligarchies. Such
criteria may indirectly reflect the stages of life. For
example, need may be determined, at least in part, by the
stage of development. Merit may be based upon the
120. For a discussion of the nature of various goods, see GEORG HENRIK VON
WRIGHT, THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS (1963). The recognition of the limits upon

conceiving goods as fungible items to be distributed and the recognition that
there is no central "distributor" of goods in society has led some philosophers to
reject the notion of distributive justice completely. See ROBERT NOzICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
121. I have chosen to look at the question of the stages of life as a problem of
distribution of goods to the various stages of life. An alternative way of looking
at the problem is to view the law as structuring the time of our lives. The
marking of boundaries of stages and the distribution of goods to those stages
may be seen in a more abstract manner as the distribution of times of our lives.
Following the words of Ecclesiastes and the popular song, the law states that
there is a time for every purpose under heaven. To view the stages of life in
terms of "the times" of life would enables me to draw a parallel to Rakoffs fine
work in which he explores the allocation of time to activities in society. Just as
the law distributes time horizontally in society, it also may allocate it vertically
within the history of society and the lives of its members. Linking the stages of
life to "the times of life" encourages an inquiry into the nature of time. Is time
defined in terms of the natural processes of our development? Is it simply the
mechanical measurement in equal units of the course of our lives? Is it a
cumulative process, expressed in the subjective notion of duration or the
objective notions of a measurable development process? Is it cyclical? All of
these questions may be raised by viewing the law as allocating time of our lives.
I have chosen not to follow this approach in this Essay. I will, however, return
to the theme of time and its social role in my discussion of the social meaning of
the stages of life below and in a brief conclusion.
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recognition of certain acquired excellences likely to come in
the middle stages of life. And accumulated wealth, unless
inherited, might also come later in life through economic
activity. Thus, these criteria for distribution may reflect, at
least in part, underlying stages of development. Perhaps, if
knowledge were available, a more refined set of criteria for
distribution according to need, freedom and merit reflecting
the stages of development might be desirable. Alternatively,
one might seek to create a contextual set of distributive
criteria based directly upon stages of life. To develop such
criteria will require an initial effort to define the social
meaning of each stage of life; such an effort will be
discussed in the next section.
If the meaning of the stages of life can be determined
and criteria can be developed for such stages, insofar as the
political community allocates goods, it may adopt legal
means to do so. The law allocates goods by the
establishment of autonomies for certain ages, and the
provision of protective regimes. These may be thought of as
the distribution of freedoms. For example, autonomy may
be offered after viability in the womb, and certain
protections may be offered to children or older adults who
appear vulnerable due to their stage of development. Laws
may be enabling laws, enabling persons at certain stages to
participate in the societal (e.g., driver's license, drinking
age eligibility) and civic life (e.g., draft and voting ages).
The enabling law may offer the opportunity to develop
certain moral and political virtues, but, because the law is
permissive, it leaves the choice up to the individual. In the
cases of laws requiring military service, school attendance
or parental obligations, the laws serve to define and
implement social duties. Similarly, tort law may determine
social duties based upon role-related determinations of
negligence. Laws may offer negative or positive incentives at
certain stages of life. Thus, laws permitting the one time
sale of one's home without capital gains tax may seek to
encourage the elderly to abandon their family home, freeing
it up for larger families. And finally, laws may serve welfare
functions, such as social security laws which distribute
welfare to families with children and old persons, thereby
facilitating the meeting of basic needs at these stages of life.
A myriad disputes surround each of these functions of
laws. The legal and political debates surrounding the
distribution of goods based upon the stages of life may be
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classified as follows. First, the question is raised as to
whether these laws are really targeted at stages of life, or
whether the stage of life aspect of the law in question is
incidental to some other public purpose. Are marriage,
drinking, and driving laws all related to defining the stage
of adolescence or are they incidental unrelated laws bearing
upon a series of different and unique public problems? This
suggests a second question: does it make sense to target
laws to particular stages of life? For example, should Aid to
Families With Dependent Children be limited to families
with children of a certain age? A third and closely related
question is whether the political community should look to
generic stages of life or whether a more individualized
approach should be adopted. Thus, as suggested by the
Murgia decision above, should eligibility for access to police
jobs be distributed according to an age-related or an
individual fitness criterion? A fourth question is whether or
not the political community should determine the
distribution of goods at all, or if it should instead be left to
nature, custom or the marketplace. A fifth question is
whether the distribution should be determined by
individual choice and markets rather than by the political
or economic community.
In terms of the first question: is the law which seems to
recognize stages of life really concerned with such stages as
stages of development or is the stage-of-life aspect simply
incidental? In situations where the law pays specific
attention to the capacity of individuals, for example, their
responsibility in tort and criminal law, it appears clear that
stages of life are an important consideration. The
importance of stages of life may also apply to laws
pertaining to eligibility for certain activities, such as
drinking or driving, or certain social duties, like military
service. The underlying assumption of these laws may be
that a person can only conduct these activities at a certain
stage of life. Protective and welfare laws may apply to the
status of vulnerability, rather than stage of life itself; it
must happen that at certain stages, persons may be more
vulnerable. Whether this vulnerability is necessarily
related to a stage of development is a more tenuous
question.
A second issue is that whether it makes sense to
"target" laws to stages of life may depend upon the reason
for targeting. One may target stages of life because one
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believes there is a set of stages of development which people
do and should go through. Alternatively, one may simply
focus upon stages of life because the stage is related to some
public purpose. Thus, draft age may relate to the notion
that physical courage and effectiveness take place at a
certain stage of life and this courage and effectiveness are
what is needed in our fighting forces. Most people would
agree that focusing upon stages of life should be for specific
public purposes. But it would be less agreed upon that the
law should somehow help to guide the individual through
the stages of life. Yet, it is this classical notion which is
more interesting. In order to defend such a classical view, it
may be necessary to demonstrate that each stage of life has
its own essential meaning or meanings which should be
"realized" by each individual. In the next section, I shall
explore the "meanings" of stages of life argument.
Third, if there are generic stages of life, and they have
meanings, it still is necessary to explore whether each
individual shares in these stages. There may be an
individual variance in relation to the stage of life and there
may be individuals who "break the mold." This issue of
individualism is especially important in our nation where
individualism is given pride of place. This is related to the
fifth question identified above, i.e., what is the role of
individual choice in the allocation of goods to different
stages of life? Again, it may be best to explore this question
in more detail after a discussion of the meanings of the
stages, because if there is a meaning to the stages of life,
one would have to weigh the issue as to whether individuals
must share in that meaning.
The fourth question, i.e., the role of the political
community vis-a-vis markets and nature in the allocation of
goods to the stages of life may depend upon whether we can
determine if there is an appropriate allocation of goods
based upon the stages, and whether nature and custom can
make that allocation without the help of the political
community. Thus, as Aristotle and others have recognized,
a specific approach to the common good may determine the
nature of the proper allocation.
The fifth question-who should allocate the goods-is a
question not unique to stages of life, but applies to the
distribution of goods in society more generally. What is the
justice of such allocations and can only the political
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community achieve this justice? Does an awareness of the
stages of life affect general conclusions about proper
distribution of goods in society?
3. Establishingthe Meanings of the Stages of Life. The
Greeks believed that a whole life had meaning and its
stages were given meaning by the whole lifespan. Similarly,
the modern "meaning of life" consists of lives which are not
dominated by worthless, trivial, pointless or futile
activities, viewed as absurd. 122 This meaningful life is
composed of projects with which we identify because we
believe our engagement in them will satisfy us by making
our lives better. This satisfaction is, in turn, based upon
objective conditions of the natural world, the given
conditions of the social world, and our own and our society's
choices and beliefs. The law contributes to the articulation
and promotion of the social conditions of that meaning.
As we have seen above, Erikson and others have
identified a series of stages, based in part upon natural
development
processes,
accompanied
by
cognitive,
psychological, and (for some) moral development. For
Erikson, each successful stage of life results in the
resolution of crises which yields the components of a
healthy personality-basic trust, autonomy, initiative,
industry, identity, intimacy, generativity, and integrity.
The meaning of life is achieved by the resolution of these
crises at each stage and the attainment of a "healthy
personality." Aristotle might have added that it is the
activity of functioning in accordance with that healthy
personality which constitutes a meaningful life.
The Eriksonian components of a healthy personality, in
turn, have been subjected to a variety of developmental
studies, leading to confirmations,
refutations
and
elaborations. Philosophers have either critiqued such
constructions of "healthy personalities" or elaborated upon
these constructions, offering their own reflective account of
the stages of lives. 123 The result of modern inquiry has been
a pluralism of views concerning the meaning of the stages

122. For a discussion of the pluralism of views pertaining to the meanings of
life, see generally JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993).

123. I have summarized above the conclusions of one such philosophical
account, that of David Norton.
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of life, the definition of these stages, and their applicability
to different population groups. These stages of life have also
been found to change over time, both with technological
changes and accompanying societal changes. Finally,
development theorists have conceded that any generic
stage-of-life format is subject to significant individual
variances and, at least in the middle stages of life, the
possibility of individual choice. In short, the fundamental
conclusion
of modern
developmental
science
and
philosophical pluralism is that there is no
agreement
124
pertaining to the meaning of life or its stages.
Despite the uncertainties which affect the entire field of
development science, common sense suggests that society
does "define" stages of our lives, and contributes or ratifies
social meanings to those stages. Childhood, adolescence,
young adulthood, marriage and family stages, late
adulthood, and retirement are broadly recognized stages
and both laws and institutions correspond with these
stages, even if the natural and social development and
individual choices of some individuals diverge from this
broad set of categories. 125 Thus, although it may not be
possible to ground the meanings of the stages of life in some
agreed upon scientific account of the natural and
psychological stages of life or their philosophical
interpretation, it is possible to recognize that these stages
and their meanings do exist and are, in part, constructed by
our society and its laws. This construction may be
acknowledged when laws are treated as part of our
expressions of culture, narratives, norms, or simply social
meanings.
The recognition of the social construction of meaning is
important. "Meaning" is the symbolic processes by which we
understand the world in which we live, and, more
specifically, the legitimation of the social institutions which
124. For an overview, see DEVELOPMENTAL THEORIES THROUGH THE LIFE
CYCLE, supra note 91.

125. There is a deeper underlying assumption to my discussion of the
discrete meaning of stages of life, namely, a metaphysical "essentialism"
according to which each stage of life has its "essential meaning" (whether
created by society or naturally "real"). A discussion of this assumption would
take us far afield. For a discussion of "essentialism" in relation to other
principles of reality, see generally WALTER WATSON, THE ARCHITECTONICS OF
MEANING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A NEW PLURALISM (1985).
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are part of that world. In the words of Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann,
The symbolic universe also makes possible the ordering of the
different phases of biography.... The periodization of biography is
symbolized at each stage with reference to the totality of human
meanings. To be a child, to be an adult, and so forth-each of these
biographical phases is legitimated as mode of being in a symbolic
universe .... A modern psychological theory of personality
development can fulfill the same function. In both cases, the
individual passing from one biographical phase to another can
view himself as repeating a sequence that is given in the "nature
That is, he can reassure himself
of things" or in his own "nature."
12 6
that he is living "correctly."'

One recent study of the social meanings of life is the
study of the nature of generations, the twenty year periods
of population cohorts. This study suggests that for the same
cohort, the meaning of life does not change. Each
generation is indelibly shaped by political and social events
(among other pressures) such as depression and war, as
well as demographic events, such as the baby boom. These
generations are examples of groups of our population which
are fashioned by principal events in our history. 127 These
events, however, give a stability of outlook to the generation
throughout its different stages of life rather than, as I and
others suggest, the social meaning changing for individuals
as they move through stages.
Not only does society shape the meanings of the stages
of life, but it also shapes the very nature of the time
128
according to which these stages should be measured.

126. PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY 92 (1966).
127. WILLIAM STRAUSS & NEIL HOWE,
AMERICA'S FUTURE, 1584-2069 (1991).

GENERATIONS:

THE HISTORY OF

128. For some of the many discussions of the different kinds of time, see
ROBERT LEVINE, A GEOGRAPHY OF TIME (1997); JEREMY RIFKIN, TIME WARS: THE
PRIMARY CONFLICT IN HUMAN HISTORY (1987); EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, HIDDEN
RHYTHMS: SCHEDULES AND CALENDARS IN SOCIAL LIFE (1985). As for discussions
of time and law, in addition to Rakoffs work, see CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, A
MOMENT'S NOTICE: TIME POLITICS ACROSS CULTURES (1996); CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1987); David M. Engel,

Law, Time, and Community, 21 L. & SOc'Y REv. 605 (1987); Rebecca R. French,
Time in the Law, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 663 (2001); Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in
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Although there have been many efforts to construct
schemas for the different natures of time, let me (somewhat
arbitrarily) distinguish three kinds of time which may
correspond to stages of life. The first kind of time is
developmental time, in which society and its young
participants pass through their stages of life measured by
their own natural and social development and their
acquisition of competencies and maturity. The second stage
of life, the vast middle segment of our days on earth, is
dominated by mechanical time-a time measured uniformly
by the clocks of science and industry. The third stage of life,
cyclical time, is best recognized by or created for an old age
which recognizes the cycles of nature, lives and generations.
The legitimation of the stages of life, including their
different notions of history and time, may be found in the
social norms and narratives which are part of social
meanings. 129 These norms, in turn, are embodied in, and
articulated by statutes and legal opinions, some of which
have been identified above. Legal commentators have
identified and discussed the important role of law in the
construction or modification of social meanings. What is the
law's role in this creation of meaning? On the one hand,
where there is consensus on meanings, legislation and court
opinions may simply articulate this consensus. For
example, in the words of a Supreme Court case:

Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631
(1989).

Rebecca French has provided a remarkable overview of the ways in which
the different senses of time enter the law and legal practice. The following
paragraphs were inspired by the much more thorough discussion of these topics
by French. See French, supra.
One person recognizing the different views of time depending upon the stage
of development is James K. Feibleman. See, e.g., JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN, THE

STAGES OF LIFE 231 (1975). In another sense, a deeper view of time at different
stages of life is indirectly offered by Feibleman, who argues that different
philosophers and their philosophies appear to reflect and express different
stages of life. In so far as these philosophies embody radically different views of
time, one would then find different times to be appropriate to different stages.
See generally FEIBLEMAN, supra.

129. I am suggesting an approach to social meanings of laws which moves
from the diffuse meanings within our culture, to social norms and rules, to
specific legal rules. The causal direction of this continuum is more complex than
the unidirectional movement suggested here.
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The line between childhood and adulthood is drawn in different
ways by various States. There is, however, complete or near
unanimity among all 50 states and the District of Columbia in
treating a person under 16 as a minor for several important
purposes. [These include driving, marriage, jury membership,
gambling, purchase of pornographic materials.] All of this
legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as well as
the long history of our law, that the normal 15-year old is not
prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult.130

On the other hand, the law may have to settle conflicts
over the meaning of the stages of life. Recently, the
Vermont Supreme Court faced the issue of defining the
symbolic meaning of marriage when a same-sex couple
13
claimed the constitutional (and statutory) right to marry. '
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
marriage stage was indissolubly linked to child raising.
From the court's point of view, marriage or at least civil
union was a permanent stage of intimacy rather than a
prelude to child raising. Thus, a stage of life was defined or
redefined!
Obviously, the court's acting as an arbiter of the social
meanings of stages of life raises fundamental questions
about the role of law in general and the courts in particular
as

creators

rather

than

mere

supporters

of symbolic

meanings. The proper role of courts in the articulation of
these meanings of the stages of life is a topic, a full
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this introductory
Essay.132
IV. ELDER LAW: THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE STAGE OF OLD
AGE

"I hate the men who would prolong their lives by food
and drink and charms of magic art perverting nature's

course to keep off death they ought, when they no longer

130. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824 (1988).
131. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
132. The discussion of the Supreme Court's role in specifically setting forth
the stages of foetal development in Roe v. Wade may be related to such an
inquiry. See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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serve the land, to quit this life,3 and clear the way for
youth."13
The fourth function of the law of stages of life is the
creation of a more comprehensive legal regime around those
stages. Probably the most developed legal regime of any
stage of life is the array of laws bearing upon the stage of
old age. This has given rise to the notion of a specialized
field of law called "elder law." This field embraces, but is
not limited to, laws pertaining to health care decisionmaking, Medicare, Medicaid, Medigap, long-term care
insurance, the regulation of nursing homes, housing
and
alternatives
to
alternatives,
guardianship
guardianship, social security, protection of pension plans,
and the prohibitions of age discrimination and neglect.
(Although estate planning and the making of testamentary
and living wills are not necessarily reserved to the elderly,
much will-making and will-revision takes place at that age,
a fact which sheds much light upon an understanding of the
meaning of the state of old age). The special "density" of
laws as applied to old age offers a particularly good example
of a regime of law applied to a stage of life.
To treat old age or any stage as having a legal regime is
not to assume that old age is the equivalent to a separate
life. Posner suggests treating old age as equivalent to a
separate life. Such a suggestion ignores the fact that each
stage fits into our lives as part of one integrated person. It
is this integrated person that is described so well in Edward
Casey's Remembering: A Phenomenological Study. In
Casey's words, a person has "thick autonomy," which
"means possessing a depth not easily penetrable by . .
consciousness ... resistant to conceptual understanding...;
[being] sedimented in layers . . . ; and having 'historical
depth' .... 134
To view the array of laws applying to one stage of life as
a "legal regime" suggests that a stage of life be treated as a
"commons of years" which is governed by a cluster of laws
and institutions applicable to "the age commons," analogous
to the way in which legal regimes govern common natural
133. Euripides, The Suppliants, in 1 THE COMPLETE GREEK DRAMA 919
(Whitney J. Oates & Eugene O'Neil Jr. eds., E. P. Coleridge trans., Random
House 1938).

134. See CASEY, supra note 32, at 265.
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resources. 135 By viewing elder law as the establishment of a
legal regime for the aging stage of life, one can begin to
view the complex cluster of rules bearing upon this stage as
a whole, and then ask questions about the actual and
desirable role of such a legal regime as a whole.
The many kinds of roles of law pertaining to all stages
of life as described above are part of the legal regime of old
age. Thus, recordation laws set the chronological times for
the stages of life (in effect, setting its boundaries in time);
within these boundaries, the legal regime determines
eligibility for allocating resources, such as social security,
pensions, and access to nursing homes. The legal regime of
old age establishes the rights and protections of that age,
i.e., the age at which guardianship applies and the age at
which discrimination laws apply. Thus, recordation laws
establish the lower boundaries, (death may establish the
upper boundaries!) in which the legal regime of old age
operates. The questions to ask about the establishment of
borders of the stages of life might be similar to the
questions to be asked about geographical borders of a
natural commons. Should the markers for the boundaries
all be the same, applying equally to all persons?
It is important to recognize that the legal regime of
aging operates to enable the distribution of a wide variety
of goods to the elderly within their stage of life: income,
housing, medical care, and respect (or at least freedom from
disrespect), are some of the major goods distributed. That
distribution may be based upon age-related merit (e.g.,
veterans benefits) or need (e.g., Medicare). The law may
enable or protect contributions to public and private
pensions at earlier stages of life for later use in old age,
thus linking the earlier stages of life to the stage of old age.
The law may play a variety of more specific roles in the
distribution of goods, including defining the nature and
amount of public welfare goods to be received or through
protection of pension contracts for the receipt of goods.

135. See ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES:
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1982).

NATURAL RESOURCES AND
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The legal regime may articulate the meaning of the
stage of life, i.e., old age. 136 Here is an example from
legislation in Maine:
This declaration of a people shall serve as a credo of the
elderly offering a philosophy that serves as a general state of
policy and basic tenets to guide the administration and
implementation of this Act. The declaration of a people:
We older Americans place great emphasis on leading a life of
value to our nation, states, communities, friends, families and to
ourselves. America's elderly want to and are able to contribute to
the good of our fellow human beings, even if such contribution lies
outside the traditional realms of employment and productivity. We
want to help improve the quality of life of each citizen of the
United States regardless of his age. Our personal experiences,
knowledge and skills are our qualifications. We are a strong, vital
segment of society. We possess the power of a people.
We older Americans believe that attaining the status of senior
citizen is merely beginning another stage in the life of each man
and is not a signal to withdraw from life. Each person ages from
birth to death. We are all aging men.
While our particular page in the history of mankind is the
choice of our Creator, it is our place in history which surrounds us
with the consequences of American society. Aging men have been
transformed by the events of American society. America's elderly
now gain sustenance and meet social needs outside our homes, and
have no family under our roof. Once we were dependent on our
family, now we are dependent on impersonal organizations,
systems and our society as a whole. America's exiling of us as the
unwanted generation is its loss-its economic, its human, its
moral, its spiritual loss.
We do not want to be taken from the mainstream of life, away
from the everyday activities of society, and put on the shelf. We do
not want a dole, but rather help in our times of crisis. We wish to
live with minimum dependence on other people and government.

136. For another somewhat different view of the meaning of old age, see
generally AMERY, supra note 94. Amery argues that the characteristics of aging

are the progressive view of time as the essence of one's existence, the growing
alienation from one's self and body, the increased realization that is no longer
possible to live according to one's potential abilities, the gradual loss of the
ability to understand new developments in the arts and the changing values of
society, and the gradual feeling that we have arrived at the time of life when
death is within us. See generally id. For a very different perspective, see
EsPOSITO, supra note 76, at 80. These somewhat different views of aging raise
the question as to whether any one meaning of old age or any other stage of life
can be confidently asserted.
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To achieve this credo, we older Americans believe the United
States must provide us a full and equal opportunity for meeting
sustenance and social needs-the same opportunity that is enjoyed
by our fellow citizens. To continue fulfilling our role in history, to
continue helping our fellow human beings and to enrich our
society; the elderly must be provided an opportunity to attain the
basic essentials of life ....137

Although the Maine law is somewhat unique, the full
meaning of old age is not grasped by the Maine law. Despite
the laudable effort to reintegrate their elderly into everyday
life, the old age stage of life should also be defined by its
proximity to decay and death. That proximity to death
forces the stage of old age to cope with its inevitable decay
of selected vital powers to be exercised in the present,
resulting in the elderly's "natural turn" of attention to the
past both because of its extensive experience of the past and
its limited biographical future. In the words of the poet
Kelly Cherry, "[i]t is the loss of possibility that claims you
bit by bit." 138
Most of the laws in the traditional field of elder law
appear to be laws protecting the elderly as vulnerable, and
providing resources for the final stages of life. Such a focus,
the outgrowth of the welfare state, views the elderly as
vulnerable, and old age as one of vulnerability. 139 Such laws
capture one aspect of the meaning of aging, i.e., the gradual
diminishment of physical and often mental capacities
during old age. The set of laws dealing with decay and
vulnerability may seek to prevent or delay such decay, or
keep it from impeding other vital functions of living. What
is important here is the message which accompanies the
legal response to the vulnerabilities of old age, a message
which may disempower the elderly.

137. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 5102 (West 2004).
138. KELLY CHERRY, Lines Written on the Eve of a Birthday, in NATURAL
THEOLOGY 41 (1988).

139. Although we are all vulnerable, some are more vulnerable than others.
The stage of old age can operate to join old people with other people of all ages
who are vulnerable. An ethical and political "philosophy of vulnerability"
becomes

relevant. See generally ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE
VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1985); STEVEN
LUPER, INVULNERABILITY: ON SECURING HAPPINESS (1996).
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A second meaning of old age involves its presumed
unique awareness of, and sensitivity to, future generations.
Since old age's future is necessarily limited by death, only
religious beliefs in future immortality or a secular focus
upon the welfare of future generations can inform old age's
struggle with the meaning of death. 140 The field of estate
law offers the elderly, if they have property, an opportunity
to define their relations to those generations. Few legal
scholars have captured the importance of wills as a vehicle
of old age's confrontation with death; the recent study of
ancient wills and the recovery of the Jewish tradition of
"ethical wills" is an effort to treat testamentary law as
something more than the transfer of wealth. 141 These laws
can create a means by which the old can devote their
wisdom and resources to future generations; hence the old
can embrace and affect the future course of the world,
nation and local community. Like wills, political, civic, and
can be
intellectual commitment of the old to a better future
42
an especially important part of the life of old age. 1
Wills may perform another function, i.e., an opportunity
for the early confrontation with death, which is a third
dimension of aging. On the one hand, death is often treated
as a matter of religion, perhaps to be confined to a nongovernmental realm by the constitutional wall of
separation. On the other hand, "living wills" and laws
establishing humane ways of dying offer legal opportunities
for the old to confront death, and in so doing, assist the
elderly to confront the end of their own lives.
A final meaning accorded to old age is its concern with
the past: "But that is part of their plan. To strip you of your

140. This definition is based upon reflections on my own early old age and
the discussions of others. For a delightful collection of materials, see WAYNE
BOOTH, THE ART OF GROWING OLDER: WRITERS ON LIVING AND AGING (1992). I am
aware that many see early modern old age as a new period of leisure and
creativity or as the extended rich continuation of one's middle aged vocation.
Even if such creativity and continuation takes place, it does so in the shadow of
the end of life and for many, an awareness of that end.
141. See Judith Frank, The Human Legacy: Using Ethical Wills to Enhance
Estate Planning,6 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 65, 65-66, 70-71 (2003).
142. Obviously, there can be some conflict between a state of flagging
energies and the need for energetic civic or political commitments. Voting can
be a weak substitute for such active commitment.
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future and put the past in its place."'143 If youth focuses
upon ambitions for the future, and middle aged adults focus
upon their present cares and responsibility, old age is often
an age in which the past increasingly looms in importance.
Perhaps this is because the past is all that old age hasdespite concerns for future generations, the future is very
limited for the old and the present may be or seem less
practically urgent. It may appear as if concern for the past
in old age is not captured in any law, but the law is
permeated with concern for the past as exemplified in a
common law which reaches into past precedents, 144 a
constitution which stands a monument of the past, 145 and a
legal culture which may be properly labeled a legal
tradition, 46 embracing the past. Law not only reflects the
past, but also enables our practices of reminiscence and
commemoration of the past, whether of the past important
events of our community, or the past lives of now deceased
friends and heroes. In terms of reminiscence, the legally
recorded and structured stages of life offer a framework of
"reminiscentia," by which the old can engage in the shared
wistful reliving of the past (wistful because the memory is
accompanied by knowledge that the past cannot be fully
relived). Although reminiscence functions primarily to
strengthen
links
between
family
and
friends,
commemoration serves a more public function, solemnized
in ceremony and honoring events and people in a way which
strengthens the communities' values. 47 A recent literature
of historical memory and commemoration has suggested
that there is an individual ethics and community politics of

143. CHERRY, supra note 138, at 41.

144. For the law as tradition, see Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
145. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 10-24 (1982) (discussing various historical arguments that can be
made about the Constitution); CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 15 (1996) ("Constitutionalism typically requires
obedience to the historical Constitution .... ").
146. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE
DIVERSITY IN LAw 6 (2000).

147. See CASEY, supra note 32, at 216.
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memory and that law and society may shape, express,
and
148
preserve in significant ways our common memories.
V. THE IDEAL OF THE ARC OF LIFE

A. The Knitting of the Stages
"[L]iving together .... means that the individual's lifestages are 'interliving,' cogwheeling with the stages of
"149
others .
In Roper v. Simmons, the majority argued that its
recognition of the juvenile status of an offender at the time
of the offense had relevance to the past and future of the
offender's life. The court recognized past events in the
offender's life-events which suggested his maturity and
hence, his status as a juvenile. On the other hand, the court
recognized the future of the offender and considered his
capacity for being reformed in the future. In so doing, the
court was knitting together the stages of the offender's life;
the court recognized that the stages of life are part of "a
life"-they are not discrete steps in a ladder to nowhere.
Life is a continuity, established by biological
persistence, habit, and psychological awareness creating
linkages between and among the stages, yielding a "thick"
social and religious identity. In fact, it has been argued that
any notions of stages of life are merely a set of arbitrary
categories imposed upon that continuity. According to such
an argument, continuity is basic; stages are secondary. The
sense of continuity is captured in Bergson's sense of time as

148. For a particularly excellent, detailed study of one kind of
commemoration, see NICOLE LORAUX, THE INVENTION OF ATHENS: THE FUNERAL
ORATION IN THE CLASSICAL CITY (Alan Sheridan trans., 1986).

There is another way in which the law is involved in the past-a way to
which old age can attend, if it chooses to do so. Since law itself embodies the
past, not only in the continuity of our legally established political community,
but also in the very operation of our common law system which looks to the past
in the fashioning of common law rules, interpretations of past history of
statutes and the meanings of the constitution, an old age which is sensitive to
such a past offers a unique vantage point for looking at the workings of the law.
While memory and legal skills remain intact, some of the old can study and
report on the history of our law as part of our civic memory.
149. ERIK H. ERIKSON, INSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY 114 (1964).
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"duration." In Bergson's words, "[p]ure duration is the form
which the succession of our conscious states assumes when
our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its
present state from its former states."'150
Nevertheless, stages do exist, and they are tied
together, 15' not only by the basic continuity of our lives, but
by the law itself. The law requires one stage of life to take
account of or consciously deny and forget another stage. The
simplest example is education laws. These laws impose
upon the youthful stage of life to serve the following states.
Education laws take play or work time away from children
and youth in order to "prepare" them for other stages of life.
A second "knitting" law may be marriage and child
protection laws. These laws require that married persons
with children limit any free swinging life in order to care for
their children and their children's welfare. A third law
which knits the stages of our lives are public pension laws.
These laws may encourage or require persons who work to
save for their old age rather than spend all their money on
themselves at an earlier stage of life. All of these laws
operate to knit together the time of our lives from childhood
to old age by requiring an earlier stage to take into account
a later stage of life. As I indicated in my discussion of
recordation, reminiscence and commemoration, our laws
may require, or at least encourage, later stages of life to
remember earlier stages.
Laws also may enable the denial of stages of our lives.
For example, the expunging of past criminal records
operates to permit the individual and society to deny past
stages. Statutes of limitation are forgetting devices as well.
Various kinds of lustration laws permit reparation,
reconciliation, and moving on from past crimes and wars.
Even bankruptcy may be viewed as an economic denial of
the past. These examples, however, do not simply deny the
past, but accommodate it in some way, such as through
"sealed records," reparations, reconciliation, or ruined
credit.

150. HENRI BERGSON, TIME AND FREE WILL 100 (F. L. Pogson trans., Harper
Torchbook 1960) (1910).
151. For a discussion of how stages might fit into an entire life, see
SETTERSTEN, supra note 12.
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There are several questions we might ask about these
laws. We might ask how adequately they assist in knitting
our lives together. Is the education we receive adequate to
serve the needs of a future life? Are we required or
encouraged to save adequately for our old age? Do we offer
the appropriate institutional support for adolescents
confronting their life choices? Do we provide the
appropriate education and preparation for parenthood? In
asking these questions, we are, of course, implicitly
assuming that the law should serve the ethical function of
supporting the good life-i.e., a fulfilling career, a happy old
age, effective parenthood. Many might question whether
such an ethical function is suitable to the law. 152 Hence, the
role of law in knitting the stages of life together again
raises the issue of freedom.
The issue is stated in terms of paternalism and justice.
Paternalism suggests that society and its representatives
know what is best for the individual and hence, by means of
law, will encourage, provide incentives, or coerce
individuals to undertake activities at one stage of their lives
for the benefit of another stage. 153 Such paternalism might
be easy to justify in the case of children and even young
adults, but it becomes more questionable when applied to
adults. Nevertheless, legislatures have adopted and the
courts have upheld measures such as social security and
child protection laws, although primarily based upon a
liberal rationale that such laws prevent harms to others.
The risk of harms to others at a future time operates to
justify the laws, which then engage in the forging of ethical
lives for individuals by requiring them to undertake
activities at one stage which serve another stage.
The issue of justice arises when the law seeks to knit
the stages of life. To the extent that the law requires an
individual to make sacrifices at one stage of her life to
prepare for another stage of her life or others' lives, the law
is allocating goods between the stages of the person's own
life (a kind of internal justice), or between the stages of one

152. Of course one might defend the role of law here as simply the liberal
preventing of harms, such as the prevention of destitution in old age or the
social cost of inadequate parenthood.
153. For a discussion of paternalism in relation to aging, see ESPOSITO,
supra note 76, at 154.
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person's life and another's (social and political justice).
Certain leisure or resources are taken away at one stage of
life, requiring work to serve another stage. Is this just?
Resources are given via taxes to provide for ourselves and
others in a social security system. Are these taxes just?
Taxes are paid for education and health services which
serve people at different stages of life than our own. What is
the criterion of justice for making such an allocation? Is
there a justice to be achieved between the stages of a
person's own life? Can I be unfair to my earlier or later self?
Can a young person be unjust to himself in his own old age
by not saving enough at an earlier stage of life in order to
enable a later comfortable old age? 154 Is there a justice of
saving? Similar questions might be raised about
contributions of one person for another person at a different
stage of life. And, if justice does not obtain either within the
stages of our lives or between our stage of life and the
stages of others' lives, should the law try to fix what the
degree of injustice might be and should the law enforce it?
These questions lead us to the more general topic of justice
within ourselves and between groups of people at different
stages of life.
B. The Stages of Life and Justice
"Why dost though not give thanks as at a plenteous feast,
[c]ramm'd to the throat with life, and rise and take thy
155
rest?"
The stages of life, viewed either organically or socially,
cannot be defined in themselves. Each stage incorporates a
relationship to groups at other stages. The stage of
childhood refers to a stage of dependence upon others living
at other stages of life. The stage of adolescence is the
movement from childhood to the world of adulthood. The
stage of parenthood defines the stage of responsibility for
another stage of life, i.e., childhood. And the stage of old age
implicates both dependence upon those who are younger
and, perhaps, duties to the young of this and future

154. It is this question which has led Posner to divide the self into two: a
young and old self. See POSNER, supra note 61, at 56.
155. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, bk III, reprinted in 1 WORLD
MASTERPIECES 558, 561 (Maynard Mack ed., John Dryden, trans., 1973).
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generations. Since each stage of life is necessarily involved
in relations with other stages, each is subject to definition,
at least in part, in terms of the justice of its relationship to
the other stages. Thus, the stages of parenthood and old age
are defined, in part, as stages which participate in the
duties from and to other generations. To be "old" implies
relationships and consequent duties to and rights from
younger persons. To be "a parent" involves duties to and
obligations from one's children.
When we speak of justice among the stages of life, we
may be talking about justice between generations, both
living and future. At this point, there is an intersection
between the notion of stages of life and generations. As a
consequence, the concern for justice between stages of life
can draw upon the substantial literature of justice between
generations.156
As we have seen above, the law directly or indirectly
distributes or enables (e.g., through the market, family or
other institutions) the distribution of goods among the
stages of life. This distribution should take place in
accordance with fair rules of distribution. This fair
distribution must take into account the unique needs and
merits of each generation, but these needs and merits are
partly defined by the obligations which each generation has
to other generations. Thus, the program for the distribution
of welfare aid to families with dependent children may
distribute public welfare funds to a parent who, in turn, has
the duty to care for needy children. Veterans' benefits may
be a distribution to another generation based upon the
merit of members of that generation. Thus, the distribution
of goods to each stage of life is determined not only by the
needs of each stage, but the just responsibilities of each
stage of life to other stages.
The justice of the allocation of goods among the stages
of life may result in debates as to what is fair between the
stages of life. Recently, for example, a vigorous debate has
156. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, AM I MY PARENTS' KEEPER? AN ESSAY ON
JUSTICE BETWEEN YOUNG AND OLD (1988); NANCY FONER, AGES IN CONFLICT: A
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON INEQUALITY BETWEEN OLD AND YOUNG (1984);
DAVID LEE, GENERATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF JUSTICE (1996); JUSTICE
BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND GENERATIONS (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds.,
1992); OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (R. I. Sikora & Brian Barry eds.,
1978).
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taken place pertaining to the allocation of health care
between the young and old. The old use a large portion of
the scarce health services available to the population. Some
claim that a part of these resources should fairly be
reallocated to the young. Some have argued for limits on
the provision of health services to the elderly. Some argue
that the elderly should recognize these essential limits of
their lives, and accept those limits. Such an acceptance
might include accepting the limits of certain kinds of health
care after a certain age. Such acceptance of limited health
care would free up resources for younger persons. 157
Similar sacrifices between people in different stages of
life might be made in terms of the fixed retirement ages
which may permit younger people to occupy employment
positions. Or older persons may be encouraged to leave
their larger homes to be occupied by younger families.
Thus, just as youth may be asked to risk their lives in
defense of the country and parents are expected to devote
their lives to the proper care of their children, the elderly
may be asked to "suck it up" and cease absorbing more than
their fair share of the resources of jobs, housing, and health
care.
The ultimate issue of distribution comes at the final
stage of life: death and dying. Recent attention has been
paid to the question of who should live or die in the
allocation of scarce bodily replacement parts and the
expenditure of funds for end of life treatment.158 In deciding
who should receive scarce and expensive medical treatment,
the age of the patient is an important consideration, and
surveys indicate that the length of benefit derived from the
transplant and the age of the recipient are considered to be
important criteria. Such age related concerns are buried
within a range of criteria 59 which apply to living and dying

157. See Howard Eglit, Health Care Allocation for the Elderly: Age
Discriminationby Another Name?, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 813 (1989).
158. See JOHN F. KILNER, WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? ETHICAL CRITERIA IN
PATIENT SELECTION (1990).

159. One recent effort to establish criteria for public health care is the
"Oregon Plan." See RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND
BEYOND 3 (Martin A. Strosberg et al., eds., 1992).
Along with a number of ethicists, legal scholar Howard Eglit, in an essay on
the allocation of health care among the generations, has recognized the possible
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of every age, hence not explicitly labeled as stage of life
considerations.
I would suggest that both needs and merit are based, at
least in part, upon stages of life. The needs and merits are
defined in light of the requirements of goods necessary for
self-development according to the social meaning of the
stages of life. Thus, it may be argued that given scarce
resources for health services, less resources might be
legitimately allocated to the elderly, given the limited time
they (we) face and the limited use for such health resources
in an age of limited possibilities. Similar analyses can be
applied to health, housing and educational services.
These "stage of life" criteria of justice for the allocation
of goods to different stages of life carry a message which,
along with other laws, help to define the meaning of the
stages. In this way, the law determines the meaning of the
stages of childhood and old age by assessing their respective
levels of need and their obligation to those in other stages of
life. Without explicitly seeking to define the identity of the
stage of life, the law may indirectly do so by defining the
legal responsibilities or rights of that stage of life. In
determining the justice between generations, the law is
indeed participating in the creation of the identity of each
stage of life.
Legal conflicts emerge in situations in which each
person in a given stage of life refuses to accept the
responsibilities which are assigned to it by law. 160 In so
doing, the person may reject all or part of the identity given
to him or her by the law. As we have seen above, pushy
parents may urge that their children are no longer
"infants," but rather are "children ready for kindergarten."
Adolescents may argue that they are adults eligible to
drive, marry, and drink. Young people may reject duties to
conflict among persons at different stages of life over the amounts of health
care.
He suggests that there has been preferential treatment of the elderly in the
past over the distribution of health care, but suggests that preference to be
waning. Perhaps what emerges most clearly from his scholarship is that the
statutory and program complexity in health programming and law, combined
with the difficulty of determining commensurate needs for each stage of life
makes any definitive conclusions impossible. See Eglit, supra note 157.
160. For a discussion of the conflict between generations, see LEE, supra
note 156.
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support their older parents. Old people may refuse to retire
and make way for younger people. The demands and
consequent conflicts may lead to lawsuits. The legal claims
which emerge from these rejections may be treated in terms
of the liberal doctrines of equal protection, but in the course
of making these decisions the court may set forth their own
view of the stages of life itself and whether the claimant is
correct in claiming the benefits of a certain stage or
refusing to accept the responsibility (and consequent
identity) imposed by that stage of life.
CONCLUSION

"The curve of life is like the parabola ... which,
disturbed from its initial state of rest, rises and then
returns to a state of repose." 161
What conclusions may we draw from this admittedly
meditative review of the law of the stages of our lives?
First, I believe we can conclude that the law does ratify or
create "stages of life," albeit in a rough-hewn manner. The
law may set the boundaries of the stages, allocate the goods
to these stages, and even help to assign social meanings to
them. On the other hand, the law does not establish bright
line boundaries, clear statements regarding the meanings
of each stage, nor a sense of what goods are properly
allocated to each stage. Perhaps more attention to the law
and its relationship to life's stages might yield a clearer
view of the law of stages of life.
At the same time, it does not appear that these stages
of life are viewed either by the underlying culture or the
law as parts of an arc of a whole life. Many of us do not view
ourselves as players on Shakespeare's stage, marching
through the seven ages of man, nor do we view the law as
establishing or reinforcing those stages of life as part of a
whole. And yet, it might be desirable to view the law as
either reinforcing or establishing the arc of life. The arc of
life is simply a temporal perspective of the ethics of self-

161. CARL G. JUNG, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, in 8 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF C. G. JUNG 406 (Sir Herbert Read et al. eds., 2d ed. 1978).
This is merely one of many theories about the trajectory of life. See SETTERSTEN,
supranote 12, at 137-91.
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fulfillment. This fulfillment may be intimately related to
the natural stages of human development, and hence, the
growing science of human development and ethical
reflection offer a basis for reexamining the workings of the
law. There have been sensitive examinations of the role of
law in relation to the individual stages of life: foetal,
infancy and childhood, youth, adulthood, aging and death.
Now, perhaps what is needed is putting the life stages
together in order to better understand how law facilitates
162
and impedes self-fulfillment.
Second, although these stages may be legally defined by
the law in response to some specific short term objective,
the stages are also imbued by the law with a larger social
meaning which may serve what Merton has called the
"latent functions of the law." Thus, until recently, the law of
old age may latently create a protective cocoon for the
assumed vulnerability of the elderly, thus delivering a
message of what old age is all about. Once we are sensitive
to the underlying assumptions of the law of life stages, we
may begin to critique both our cultural views of the stages
of life and the role which the law presently plays in regard
to these stages.
Of course, even if one accepts the ethical view of selfdevelopment and recognizes that stages of life presently
exist, one might still seek to promote a form of societal
organization which ignores the stages. A liberal permission
offers maximum freedom of individuals to choose their own
stage of life. According to this view, the appropriate public
policy might be either a liberal position or an "age
integrated" one. 163 The proponents of an "age integrated"
policy argue that our stages of life reflect erroneously age
differentiated activities. Instead, what we require are age
integrated institutions in which leisure, work and education

162. For a discussion of the ideal of a "flexible life span" which seeks to
remove institution and obstacles to the access to leisure, work, and education,
see SETTERSTEN, supra note 12, at 33-64.

163. For example, Howard Eglit traces the extent to which old age, once
viewed as vulnerable to discrimination, is now receiving more than its share of
social goods. Whatever the specific conclusion in regard to this matter, Howard
Eglit is correctly raising the question as to the justice between generations. See
Eglit, supranote 157.
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take place at all stages of life. 164 Each approach implies a
reform agenda in which, inter alia, laws pertaining to
employer pensions, social security, tuition subsidies, and
age biases, would be revamped to support
a life stage, and a
165
liberal or an integrated age structure.
Third, we have seen that the stages of life defined by
the law are partly defined by the rights and duties which
the stages have to each other. If the concept of stages is
accepted, the role of law is not only to set the boundaries of
stages, help allocate goods, and express the meanings of the
stages, but also to define what the rights and duties of the
stages of life are. In the process of fixing these rights and
duties, the law further defines the stages themselves and
the justice among them. We have seen above that there are
profound questions within the law pertaining to the justice
between the generations. 166 Insofar as we envisage law as
instrument of justice, we might examine the role of law in
promoting or impeding the justice of the allocation of goods
among the stages of life.
As we have seen above, it is surprising the extent to
which the law is already increasingly defining the stages of
our lives. The increased movement towards government
supervision of child development including early childhood
development; the debate over compulsory primary and
secondary education and its appropriate role in the
preparation for later stages of life; the increased attention
to adolescence and the recommendations for government
programs for transition into adulthood through national
service programs; the placing of legal obligations upon
married adults in the proper care and support of their
children; the gradually increased support for change of
employment and careers during the adult years through
retraining programs tied to the receipt of welfare; the
myriad of programs for the elderly, and even the legal

164. See AGE AND STRUCTURAL LAG: SOCIETY'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITIES IN WORK, FAMILY AND LEISURE (Matilda White

Riley et al. eds., 1994).
165. See generally SETTERSTEN, supra note 12, at 42-64. Settersten offers a
reform program of new time budgets, work possibilities in the last third of life,
alternative times and routes to retirement, erosion of lifetime work models,
flextime work, and growth in adult education.
166. See generally Eglit, supra note 157.
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regulation of dying suggest that we are moving towards a
kind of government regulated and supported ladder in the
stages of our lives. Although, as we have seen above, such
programs serve specific public policies, they may also be
viewed as requiring a kind of justice among the stages of
our individual lives.
Fourth, if legal coercion requiring recomputation of life
stages is offensive to some, the public facilitation (rather
than coercion) of the recognition of these stages may not be.
Thus, in school, the teaching of biography-the subject of
lives taken as a whole and in stages-may be a legitimate
part of learning some minimal explicit ethical perspectives
of whole lives. 167 Perhaps the study of literature in general
and biography in particular, as well as the psychology of
human development, would be especially appropriate
subjects for revealing the stages of the arc of our and others'
lives. At the stage of adolescence, the exposure of students
to alternative ways of life through national service
programs seems advisable and persuasive cases have been
made for such service. Similarly, counseling, which includes
the opportunity for the youth to explore the implications of
alternative occupations for the rest of the counseled
student's life, would be desirable. Recommendations have
already been made for required secular counseling in
preparation for marriage to parallel the counseling now
provided by some religious groups. This counseling might
include not only an exploration of the meaning of marriage
itself, but also a discussion of the rights and duties of the
stage of parenthood.
Turning to the stage of adulthood, the meaning and
requirements of adulthood have been articulated by
religious faiths and ethical systems. The classical ethical
system identifies a series of moral virtues (which has been
modified throughout the centuries) and a series of
capacities most recently listed in modern terms by Martha
Nussbaum, as discussed above. Perhaps it is the role of
adult education and therapy to remind people of these
capacities and the important roles which activities in
accordance with these capacities play in our lives. Such
adult education and therapy may include preparation for

167. Certainly poetry appears particularly able to capture the meanings of
the stages of our lives. See BOOTH, supra note 140.
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old age and retirement. Preparationfor old age includes the
acceptance of the arc of life. In old age, social institutions
might support both the recognition and acceptance of the
growing vulnerability of age along with new opportunities
in leisure to make sense of the entire arc of one's life.

